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THE FAMILY PARADIGM OF
INHERITANCE LAW
FRANCES H. FOSTER"
In this Article, Professor Foster argues that inheritance law has
failed to adapt to modern American society because it is locked in a
family paradigm. She begins with a review of the case law and
legislation governing intestate succession, wills, contracts to devise, and
will substitutes. In the course of that review she demonstrates the
paradigm's pervasiveness and the human costs it imposes. She then
turns to scholarly reform proposals to show that despite their vitality
and innovativeness, they too have remained within the family
paradigm. Professor Foster argues that the family categories employed
in both law and scholarship are so inflexible, outdated, and culturally
biased that they harm all participants in the inheritance process. To
show the possibility of reform outside the family paradigm, Professor
Foster provides three illustrations: (1) support-based inheritance; (2)
inheritance based on decedent's intent; and (3) inheritance based on the
actual relationship between the decedent and the claimant. She
concludes with a call for the development and discussion of these and
other proposals for reform outside the family paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the inheritance system
stands as one of the last bastions of the traditional American family.'
Many of its rules and doctrines appear frozen in time, remnants of a
bygone era of nuclear families bound together by lifelong affection
and support.2 In a world where the individual has emerged from the
tyranny of the abstract,3 inheritance law continues to define people by
1. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW,
AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 289 (1989) ("The law of
inheritance remains a bastion of the legitimate family.").
2. This historical vision may be more mythical than real. Indeed, the "favorite
stereotype of the nuclear family" is taken from a television show, Leave It to Beaver.
Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 n.14
(2000) [hereinafter Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws] ("Leave It to Beaver, a television show
depicting the Cleaver family as a 'typical' American family consisting of a mother, father
and two kids, is a favorite stereotype of the nuclear family."); see Lawrence W. Waggoner,
The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate
Code, 76 IOWA L. REv. 223, 223 (1991) [hereinafter Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage
Society] ("The traditional 'Leave It To Beaver' family no longer prevails in American
society.").
3. Numerous legal scholars have called attention to the human impact of abstract
legal rules. See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN
FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxxvi (1998) ("The law affects individuals'
lives in profound ways that legal abstractions cannot capture."); Toni M. Massaro,
Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2099, 2105 (1989) ("Academics, judges, and lawyers often juggle concepts and spar
with abstractions, without consulting the human concerns actually at issue in their
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family categories. Decedents and their survivors remain first and
foremost spouses, parents, children, and siblings rather than
individuals with particular human needs and circumstances that
increasingly defy conventional family norms.4
The failure of inheritance law to adapt to the changing American
family has become a central theme in recent trusts and estates
literature Established scholars and new voices in the field have
presented a compelling picture of a system out of step with modern
American society. They have shown that inheritance rules fail to
recognize the full range of today's families;6 the growing pattern of
family abuse, neglect, and nonsupport;7 and the evolving status of
deliberations."); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CAL.
L. REV. 699, 707 (1978) ("Both rules of evidence and conceptions of relevance act to
exclude certain information, often of a human nature, that cannot be subsumed under a
given rule, and therefore have elements of legal masks.").
4. Professor Baron has noted a similar phenomenon in will interpretation cases. She
argues that under existing approaches, "[t]he focus remains on the words, not on the
complex motives by which they were produced. The discussions are bloodless. One would
hardly know that any actual people were involved-only 'testators,' 'beneficiaries,'
'scriviners,' and 'residuary devisees.' " Jane B. Baron, Essay: Intention, Interpretation,
and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 663-64 (1992). As Professor Baron states, "[t]here is
something deeply dissatisfying about a system that protects individuals only by depriving
them of their humanity." I. at 655.
5. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 79, 80 (2d ed. 1997) (titling a
chapter "The Changing American Family" and stating that "[t]he challenge facing courts
and legislatures is to provide a family property law that reflects the changing and diverse
American household"); Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 1; E. Gary Spitko,
The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41
ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1094 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, The Expressive Function of
Succession Law] (arguing that "[s]uccession law... must adapt to recognize the changing
nature of the American family").
6. See, e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family,
1996 UTAH L. REv. 93, 94 [hereinafter Brashier, Children and Inheritance] ("One of the
increasingly notable shortcomings of modern probate law is its failure to provide adequate
guidelines governing the inheritance rights of children outside the traditional nuclear
family."); Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967, 982-1019
(1996) [hereinafter Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent] (discussing the limitations of
inheritance rules in addressing posthumously conceived children and proposing reforms);
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
LAW & INEQ. 1, 15-17, 65-72 (1998) [hereinafter Fellows et al., Committed Partners]
(demonstrating that intestacy laws fail to recognize committed relationships and family
units headed by committed partners).
7. See, e.g., Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance
Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257, 259-61, 265-73 (1994) (criticizing statutes that
allow "deadbeat dads" to inherit from their children); Robin L. Preble, Family Violence
and Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401,439 (1995) (proposing
a family violence statute "to deny abusers any [inheritance] benefits from those they
abused"); Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are,
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women in society.8 They have revealed that current law retains such
an outdated definition of family that it denies donative freedom,9
frustrating even testamentary directives regarding funeral and burial
arrangements.10
Scholars have offered an array of reform proposals to modernize
specific aspects of the inheritance system. These proposals include
expanded intestacy rules to cover "nontraditional" family members,"
updated elective share provisions to implement a partnership theory
of marriage, statutory and judicial remedies for disinherited
Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REv. 517, 524-41 (1994) (discussing reform of intestate
succession laws to prevent inheritance by parents who abandoned or failed to support
their children).
8. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers", 10
LAW & INEQ. 137, 137-46, 150-52, 155-62 (1991) (criticizing the patriarchal nature of wills
and trusts law and its continuing negative impact on women); Susan N. Gary, Marital
Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49
U. MIAMI L. REv. 567,572 (1995) [hereinafter Gary, Marital Partnership Theory] (arguing
that elective share statutes are outdated and calling for adoption of a "marital partnership
theory [, which] accords with society's changing view of the role of women and the
institution of marriage").
9. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
235, 236-37, 258-60 (1996) [hereinafter Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom]
(arguing that courts manipulate mental capacity doctrines and will execution formalities to
invalidate wills that leave property to those outside the traditional family); Ray D. Madoff,
Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REv. 571, 576-77, 629 (1997) (contending that
courts use the undue influence doctrine to deny donative freedom to testators who fail to
provide for biological family members).
10. See, e.g., Tanya K. Herndndez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITt. L. REV. 971,
973 (1999) ("[F]uneral homes generally maintain a familial approach to death which
focuses upon the needs of the biological family and spouse rather than upon the
articulated preferences of a testator."); Jennifer E. Horan, Note, "When Sleep at Last Has
Come": Controlling the Disposition of Dead Bodies for Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 423, 424-25, 429-34 (1999) (arguing that the presumption in favor of the
decedent's spouse and biological family members can "confound the plans of the partners
in homosexual couples who have definite wishes as to what should be done with their
bodies at death," even where such wishes are expressed in a valid will).
11. For example, there have been numerous proposals to extend intestate succession
rights to unmarried partners. See, e.g., Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at
89-91 (calling for reform of intestacy laws to permit inheritance by committed partners);
T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex Equality,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1513, 1522-24 (1999) (proposing reform of intestacy and other default
rules to "replicate the likely intent of the GLB [Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual] community,"
including recognition of same-sex partners as heirs); Spitko, The Expressive Function of
Succession Law, supra note 5, at 1066-67 ("urg[ing] reform of the 1990 [Uniform Probate]
Code to include same-sex partners within its intestacy provisions"); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 78-86 (1994)
[hereinafter Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition] (proposing an intestacy
statute in working draft to include unmarried decedent's de facto partner).
12. See, e.g., Gary, Marital Partnership Theory, supra note 8, at 569, 596-604
(proposing a revised elective share to "appl[y] the marital partnership theory"); John H.
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children,13 and alternative dispute resolution techniques to ensure a
fair hearing for "nonconforming" wills that leave property outside the
family.1 4 Thus far, however, these efforts have yielded only limited
success15 because they are grounded in a paradigm that constrains
reform.
Several authors have recognized that American inheritance law
is rooted in a family paradigm.16 Yet, that paradigm remains
Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 308-10, 314-17 (1987) (proposing an accrual-type forced share
to implement "contribution theory... sometimes expressed as 'partnership' or 'sharing'
theory"); Rena C. Seplowitz, Transfers Prior to Marriage and the Uniform Probate Code's
Redesigned Elective Share-Why the Partnership Is Not Yet Complete, 25 IND. L. REV. 1,
67-70 (1991) (proposing guidelines to "promot[e] ... marriage as a total partnership" by
"amendling] the elective share statutes to take antenuptial transfers into account").
13. See, e.g., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of
Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1253-63 (1990) (proposing a modified version of the forced share
approach); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 83, 173-80 (1994) [hereinafter Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family]
(proposing a posthumous duty to support minor children); Ronald Chester, Disinheritance
and the American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 1, 32-
35 [hereinafter Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child] (proposing a discretionary
scheme to allow courts to address individual needs and circumstances of disinherited
children).
14. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator
from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 275, 294-97 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming]
(proposing testator-compelled arbitration of will challenges to protect a nonconforming
testator's testamentary freedom); see also Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly:
Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 417-21, 425-28 (1997) [hereinafter Gary, Mediation and the
Elderly] (discussing the advantages of mediation for resolving inheritance disputes arising
from "dispositions of property to persons outside the societal definition of the 'natural
objects of the decedent's bounty' ").
15. Drafters of the Uniform Probate Code have expressly drawn on scholarly critiques
and proposals as impetus for reform. For instance, comments to revised Article II's
intestacy and marital rights provisions refer specifically to scholars' empirical studies,
critiques, and proposals (including work by the drafters) regarding "the multiple-marriage
society and the partnership/marital-sharing theory." UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II
prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 75 (1998). See id. § 2-102 & cmt. (citing empirical studies); id. art.
II, pt. 2 general cmt. (discussing and citing work on the partnership theory of marriage).
Only a few state legislatures, however, have enacted the revised Uniform Probate Code
provisions in full. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 512 (6th ed. 2000) ("The 1990 UPC elective share provisions have been
adopted in less than a dozen states, mainly in the Great Plains.").
16. Brashier, Children and Inheritance, supra note 6, at 95 ("Our inheritance laws ...
remain entrenched in the nuclear family paradigm."); Madoff, supra note 9, at 611
(discussing the "paradigm of undue influence as family protection"). For a definition of
"paradigm," see THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10
(2d ed. 1970) (referring to "paradigm" as "defin[ing] the legitimate problems and methods
of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners").
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surprisingly unchallenged. As this Article will show, proposed
reforms have stayed uniformly within the family paradigm and been
limited by it.17 As a result, those reforms have not reached the core of
the problem-the human costs of an inheritance system based
principally on family status with insufficient regard for support,
decedent's intent, or actual relationships. This Article calls for a
different approach. It argues that reformers should confront and
reconsider the family paradigm itself.18
The stakes are enormous. As Professor Lawrence Friedman has
observed, inheritance laws act as the "template" and "genetic code of
a society," which ensure that each generation generally replicates the
structure of the previous generation. 9 In the United States, the
inheritance system responds to precisely this reproductive imperative.
Its principal function is to maintain and perpetuate the social unit that
Americans have traditionally deemed essential for a stable and
productive society-the family.2°
Preservation of the family comes at a price, however. Part I of
this Article presents an example of one victim of the family
paradigm-support.2 1 It shows that the family paradigm constrains
efforts to use decedents' estates to provide support to needy survivors
and to reward caring survivors for lifetime support of the decedent.
Part I demonstrates that these constraints pervade the entire
inheritance system in the rules and doctrines governing intestate
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH,
TAxEs AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (referring to
inheritance laws as the "template" and "genetic code of a society," which "guarantee that
the next generation will, more or less, have the same structure as the one that preceded
it"). For an extended discussion of the relationship between genetics and inheritance, see
generally John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L.
REv. 216 (1981).
20. The authors of one of the leading trusts and estates casebooks have titled their
text "Family Property Law" to emphasize the "symbiotic relationship between the
transmission of wealth and family." WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (describing
"inheritance law as playing a crucial role in the creation and maintenance of families and
family law playing a similar role in wealth transmission"). The inheritance system has put
particular emphasis on preserving the nuclear family. See Mary Louise Fellows et al.,
Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the
United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 324 [hereinafter Fellows et al., Public
Attitudes] (arguing that intestate succession laws "promote and encourage the nuclear
family"); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand,
68 IND. L.J. 1, 41 (1992) ("American society has always been, and continues to be,
characterized by nuclear families.").
21. See infra notes 32-104 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 80
FAMILY PARADIGM
succession,2 testamentary disposition,23 contracts to devise,24 and will
substitutes.25
Part II turns to existing scholarly reform proposals. It analyzes
these proposals as pursuing three broad strategies: (1) enhancing
protections for surviving family members;26 (2) redefining the family
to reflect changes in contemporary American society;27 and (3)
introducing procedural mechanisms to mitigate the effects of the
family paradigm on wills that deviate from traditional family norms.O
Part II argues that although these strategies offer significant
improvements over the existing system, they ultimately provide only
partial solutions because they fail to break out of the family
paradigm.
Part III calls upon reformers to reconsider the paradigm in which
they have been working. It argues that the family paradigm today has
become the impediment to reform and should be abandoned. Part III
first identifies the human costs of the family paradigm. Part llI.A
shows that the paradigm's inflexibility, obsolescence, and cultural bias
harm heirs and beneficiaries, potential beneficiaries, decedents,
judges, jurors, and others whose lives do not conform to the family
"ideal" the paradigm celebrates. 2 9 Based on this new understanding
of the family paradigm, Part III then contends that reformers should
develop approaches to inheritance that lie outside that paradigm.
Part III.B attempts to begin that process by offering some preliminary
ideas about possible future directions for an inheritance law not
grounded in family status. 0 Part IV concludes that the human costs
of the family paradigm now outweigh its benefits and that the most
promising directions for reform lie outside that paradigm 1
I. FAILURE OF SUPPORT UNDER THE FAMILY PARADIGM
In theory, American inheritance law performs an important
social welfare function. It supposedly encourages those with means
to provide for their dependents. 32 Yet, as this Part will show, in
22. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 106-38 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 139-83 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 184-213 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 215-57 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 258-350 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 351-66 and accompanying text.
32. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
practice, the U.S. inheritance system actually disserves support. Its
principal function is not support, but rather preservation of the
family.33 When support conflicts with family preservation, support
yields.
A. Intestate Succession
The rules of intestate succession-the default rules' that apply in
the absence of a will-provide rigidly 5 for inheritance by status. The
decedent's closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage
automatically inherit, irrespective of their actual relationship with the
decedent. 6 A spouse takes one share, a child another.37 When no
FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 3, 5 (stating that inheritance law "encourag[es]
those who can to make provision.., for those who are or may be dependents"). Note that
this argument is usually framed in terms of support of a decedent's family members. See,
e.g., MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 312 (1970) (arguing
that one of the purposes of inheritance is "meeting the maintenance needs of family
members"); Fellows et al., Public Attitudes, supra note 20, at 324 (stating that intestate
succession rules help "protect the financially dependent family").
33. State and federal death taxation schemes further promote this goal.
"[I]nheritance tax rate schedules afford preferential treatment to close relatives,"
reflecting "a social view that direct descendants have a birthright claim to the wealth while
legacies to collateral relatives and 'strangers' are in the nature of windfalls." BORIS I.
BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 11 (7th ed. 1996). Even the
estate tax, which "ordinarily tak[es] no account of the beneficiary's identity... makes a
similar concession in the case of property passing to the decedent's surviving spouse." Id.;
see I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (setting out "marital deduction" for federal
estate and gift tax purposes).
34. The conventional description of intestate succession as a default system, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1
cmt. c (1999) (stating that "[i]ntestate succession is a default regime"); DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 71 (titling chapter "Intestacy: An Estate Plan by Default"),
does not convey its full possible impact on inheritance. See Lawrence A. Frolik, The
Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do With It?, 57 U.
PITT. L. REv. 841, 858 n.106 (1996) (arguing that in undue influence cases "[t]he default
function of intestacy distributions is thus converted into normative standards of what is a
proper testamentary distribution"). Thus, as Professor Gallanis has recently underscored,
it is essential for reformers to address discriminatory default rules as well as mandatory
rules. Gallanis, supra note 11, at 1514-16 (arguing that advocates of same-sex equality
must attack not only mandatory rules but also default rules that discriminate against
sexual minorities and citing intestacy rules as one such target for reform).
35. Friedman, supra note 19, at 13 (describing U.S. inheritance rules as a "rigid
scheme").
36. For an extended discussion of common patterns of U.S. intestacy statutes, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 2
(1999); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 71-97; WAGGONER ET AL., supra
note 5, at 29-72.
37. Under some statutes, the child may not be entitled to inherit. For example, the
1990 Uniform Probate Code provides that the decedent's surviving spouse inherits the
entire intestate estate if "all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants
of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who
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"close" family members survive, the law ignores those in intimate,
dependent relationships with the decedent to confer windfalls on
distant relatives who may not even have known the decedent. Under
this scheme, behavior and need are irrelevant. In most states, the
decedent's closest relative inherits even if she abandoned, maltreated,
or physically abused the decedent." Short of murdering the
decedent,39 she retains intestate succession rights because her family
status makes her by definition a "natural object of the decedent's
bounty."40 In contrast, a blended family member,41 extended family
survives the decedent." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1)(ii) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
81 (1998). For examples of statutes that have adopted this approach, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.12.102 (Lexis 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-112 (1999).
38. For examples of recent critiques and reform proposals to address this situation,
see supra note 7. Many jurisdictions disqualify spouses who abandoned the decedent,
however. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (excluding a
spouse who "voluntarily leaves his or her spouse and goes away and continues with an
adulterer or abandons his or her spouse without reasonable cause and continues to live
separate and apart from his or her spouse for one whole year next preceding his or her
death, or dwells with another in a state of adultery continuously"). A few states also bar
parents who abandoned or refused to support their children. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4 (McKinney 1998) (disqualifying a parent who failed or refused to
provide for a minor child); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) (1999) (barring a "parent who has refused to
acknowledge or has abandoned his or her child, or a person whose parental rights have
been terminated"). One state has recently expanded its definition of "unworthy heir" to
disqualify heirs for "abuse ... of an elder or dependent adult." CAL. PROB. CODE § 259
(West Supp. 2001). This statute defines abuse broadly to include "physical abuse, neglect,
or fiduciary abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult." Id. § 259(a)(1).
For a critical evaluation of the California statute, see Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note,
Extinguishing Inheritance Rights: California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against
Elder Abuse But Fails to Build an Effective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 568-77
(2001).
39. For comprehensive analyses of the relevant statutes and case law disqualifying
"slayers" of the decedent, see generally Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely
a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489 (1986); William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and
Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65 (1969); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing
and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 803 (1993).
40. See Mundy v. Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 139 (Me. 1980) (describing intestacy and
wrongful death statutes as "designed to favor the surviving spouse and those who stand in
closest relationship within the bloodline as the natural objects of the decedent's bounty").
41. Relatives by affinity (other than the surviving spouse) generally have no intestate
succession rights. A few intestacy laws will permit inheritance, however, to prevent
escheat of the estate. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.103(5) (West 1995 & Supp. 2001)
(providing that where decedent is not survived by a spouse or kindred, the kindred of the
decedent's last deceased spouse inherit). Under most statutes, steprelatives are ineligible
to inherit. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.1-201(5) (West Supp. 2001) (barring
stepchildren from taking by intestate succession from stepparent). But see CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6454 (West Supp. 2001) (giving intestacy rights to a stepchild who had a "parent
and child relationship" with a stepparent if that relationship began when the stepchild was
a minor and continued throughout their joint lifetimes and clear and convincing evidence
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member,42 or nonrelative 43 who was the decedent's primary caregiver
or long-term dependent generally receives no recognition under
intestate succession statutes.44 She is considered an "unnatural"
recipient of the decedent's estate.45
Even among those who do inherit, the needy and the caring fall
victim to narrow statutory definitions of "natural" wealth
distributions within the family. Intestacy laws assign shares
mechanically,46 based on family status alone. They do not factor in
individual heirs' differing support needs or circumstances. As a
result, "[ilt does not matter.., whether one [heir] is rich and another
poor; one a minor, one not; one blind and destitute, [and] another
not-they share equally in the estate. '47  Similarly, intestate
exists that the stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier). A few
jurisdictions even limit the inheritance rights of "half-blood" relatives. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-2 (Michie 1995) (awarding a half-blood collateral relative half the share
of a whole-blood collateral relative).
42. "When the intestate is survived by a descendant, the decedent's ancestors and
collaterals do not take." DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 90. Thus, the
decedent's wealthy, able-bodied child excludes the decedent's elderly dependent parent
from inheritance.
43. Because intestacy laws provide rigidly for inheritance by status, nonrelatives are
ineligible to inherit. One response has been to create equitable remedies, such as
equitable adoption, to recognize those who do not qualify under intestate succession rules.
Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 917, 925 (1989) ("A well-established judicial avenue around the blood
relationship requirement of the intestacy laws is the doctrine of equitable adoption or
adoption by estoppel."). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmt. k (1999) (discussing "equitable" or "virtual
adoption"); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 113-16 (discussing equitable
adoption and equitable legitimation).
44. See John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 497,534 (1977):
None [of the statutes of intestacy] recognize non-blood, non-affinity "family."
Thus, the wholly supported foster child is excluded in favor of distant collaterals.
The dependent in-law is normally excluded, with the statutes favoring even the
state by escheat. There is no way in which the family of orientation (non-blood
individuals with whom there are very close relationships) may be recognized.
45. See In re Estate of Gersbach, 1998-NMCA-13, 24, 960 P.2d 811, 817 ("We must
conclude the gift to [the legatee] is 'unnatural' because he would not inherit under the
laws of intestacy ... ").
46. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 71 ("Under American law, as under the
English canons of descent and the Statute of Distribution, intestate shares are determined
mechanically."). As Professor Mann has remarked, "The rules of intestate succession are
'untailored' default rules that supply a single, off-the-rack standard to all intestate
estates." Bruce H. Mann, Essay: Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate
Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1050 (1994) [hereinafter Mann, Formalities and
Formalism].
47. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:" Property,
Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 354 (referring to situations where a
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succession laws permit no exceptions' to reward "acts of care"4 9
toward the decedent. The exemplary heir who remained at the
decedent's bedside for decades has no greater claim to the estate than
others of the same blood relationship.
50
B. Wills
Donative freedom is a principal value in the American system of
inheritance.51 But, as Professor Melanie Leslie has remarked, even it
can become a "myth" when a testator attempts to leave property to
those closest by affective rather than by blood or marital ties. 2
decedent dies intestate survived by siblings as his closest blood relatives).
48. Id. (stating that intestacy laws "recognize no exceptions to their formulas based on
particular family circumstances"). Illinois law presents one possible exception. The law
authorizes courts to award "conditional gifts from the estate of a disabled person to any
spouse, parent, brother or sister of the disabled person who dedicates himself or herself to
the care of the disabled person by living with and personally caring for the disabled person
for at least 3 years." 755 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/lla-18.1 (West 1993). The statute
also provides for a "statutory custodial claim" against the estate of a disabled person by
"[any spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of a disabled person who dedicates himself
or herself to the care of the disabled person by living with and personally caring for the
disabled person for at least 3 years." Id. § 5118-1.1. Note, however, that this statute too
only confers benefits on the caregiver if he or she is a close family member of the
decedent.
49. I borrow this term from Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond
Autonomy as the Foundation of Undue Influence, 71 IND. LJ. 513,514 (1996) (stating that
the "current law of undue influence... does not adequately account for acts of care").
50. For a superb critique of this flaw of intestate succession law with specific reference
to 1969 Uniform Probate Code provisions, see Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 548-51. As
Professor Gaubatz aptly remarks:
[T]here are situations in which most people would probably feel that it is fairer to
show preference for one relative of a class over others of the same class....
[W]here one member of a class provided significant services to the decedent,
most people would think such services should be rewarded. Where a child or a
nephew or a cousin takes care of an elderly relative in his declining years or helps
run the farm during a similar period, a common sense of fairness argues that a
greater share of the estate should be his.
Id. at 550. This rigid insistence on equal distribution within classes of relatives may also be
linked to efforts to reproduce a preferred family structure. See Beckstrom, supra note 19,
at 248-54 (discussing sociobiological rationales for treating children equally under
intestacy laws).
51. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 6 (discussing the "cultural tradition" of
donative freedom); Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, supra note 13, at 133
(stating that "the concept of testamentary freedom remains more important in the United
States than in other countries"). For an extended discussion of the rationales for freedom
of testation, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 20, at 6-14.
52. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 9, at 235; see id. at 243
(discussing "the duty to family and implicit presumption of invalidity where a will benefits
non-relatives"); Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 276 ("[T]he doctrines
of mental capacity, undue influence and testamentary fraud incorporate a rational bias in
favor of the testator's legal spouse and close blood relations. This bias ... imperils any
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Courts claim that the testator's intent is their "lodestar. '53 Yet, in
practice, judges and juries manipulate54 mental capacity doctrines
such as "undue influence" and "insane delusion" to reach results
more in accord with the family paradigm. Bequests to individuals
other than "natural objects of the decedent's bounty"56 --essentially
estate plan that disfavors the testator's legal spouse or close blood relations in favor of
non-family beneficiaries.").
53. See, e.g., Lounden v. Bollam, 258 S.W. 440, 444 (Mo. 1924) (stating that "the
testator's intention is the lodestar by which the courts are to be guided in determining the
meaning of a will"); In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982) ("It is settled in
this Commonwealth, as in New Jersey, that the intention of the testator is of primary
importance, the lodestar, cornerstone, cardinal rule.").
54. Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and
Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REv. 551, 586-87 (1999) [hereinafter Leslie, Enforcing
Family Promises] (arguing that courts "manipulate doctrine" to enforce an implied family
"reciprocity norm" in will contests involving disinherited family members and nonrelated
beneficiaries). In earlier work, Professor Leslie found that courts have manipulated will
execution formalities as well as mental capacity doctrines to overturn "unnatural" wills.
See Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 9, at 258-64. It is difficult to
calculate the full impact of this "manipulation." Because "knowledgeable attorneys" are
well aware of this phenomenon, many of these cases are settled out of court. Rhonda R.
Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 883,
892 (1989) (asserting that "knowledgeable attorneys" are aware of courts' use of undue
influence to set aside wills of gay men and lesbians and stating that "[u]suaUy the attack on
the will by the biological family ends with a settlement under which the testator's chosen
beneficiary is substantially dispossessed"). Moreover, this manipulation of capacity
requirements to prefer family members "inevitably infects" testators' initial
"deliberation[s]" as well and is "likely to deter them from executing an unusual plan."
Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 622 (1988)
[hereinafter Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent].
55. Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 283 (arguing that mental
capacity and undue influence "standards are sufficiently nebulous that they enable the
fact-finder to rewrite the testator's estate plan in accordance with societal norms"). For an
extended discussion and critique of mental capacity cases, see, for example, Leslie, The
Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 9, at 236-37 (arguing that "many courts are as
committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance with prevailing
normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary intent"); Madoff, supra note 9, at
576 (arguing that the "undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people
who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms-in particular, the norm that
people should provide for their families"); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the
Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 225, 267 (1981) (concluding from study of
undue influence cases that "there is at least some evidence to suggest that a homosexual
testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in greater risk of having
his testamentary plans overturned"). Mental capacity doctrines may also be used to
invalidate contracts to devise and will substitutes benefitting those who are not viewed as
natural objects of the decedent's bounty. See infra notes 77-79, 89 and accompanying text.
56. In fact, one of the requirements for mental capacity is that the testator
"know[s] ... the persons who are the natural objects of the testator's bounty."
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 163. Thus, if the will omits or even
misnames "natural objects," it may be denied probate on mental capacity grounds. Powell
v. Conner, No. CA85-04-020, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5241, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 13,
1986) (stating in a testamentary capacity decision that the "decedent misnamed both her
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family members-raise judicial red flags, even when the beneficiary
was the decedent's dependent57 or primary caregiver 8 The same is
daughter and granddaughter in the will, both of whom were the natural objects of the
decedent's bounty"). Similarly, in mental capacity cases, courts give special weight to
insane delusions regarding natural objects of the testator's bounty. See, for example, In re
Estate of Killen, 937 P.2d 1368,1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996), where the court stated:
Most significantly for purposes of the will contest, her delusions focused on
natural objects of her bounty. If, for example, when she executed her will she
had been living at the care center and her delusions had involved only staff at the
care center, her delusionary condition would have not impacted her testamentary
capacity, and the will might have been valid. However, because her insane
delusions focused on natural objects of her bounty and thus materially affected
her disposition of her property, the court correctly found the vill to be invalid.
937 P.2d at 1374.
57. See Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, supra note 54, at 622 (stating that courts
"require a substantial showing why the presumption in favor of a traditional distribution
to the family is inapposite"). Professor Fellows argues that "[a] preference for a sickly,
financially dependent child over the property owner's other children is likely to satisfy a
court that a deviation from the norm of treating all children equally was rational." Id. She
contends, however, that "a preference for a financially dependent long-time lover over the
property owner's children is unlikely to satisfy a court that a deviation from the norm of
providing for immediate family members was not the product of mental incapacity or
undue influence." Id Courts do occasionally consider the respective financial positions of
will proponents and heirs in determining whether an apparently unnatural disposition is
unfair or unjust. See Abel v. Dickinson, 467 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Ark. 1971) ("A will cannot
be said to be unnatural ... when the natural objects of the testator's bounty are in no need
of funds, aid or assistance."); Daily v. Wheat, 681 S.W.2d 747, 756 (Tex. App. 1984)
("[Tihe wealth of the proponent or contestant may occasionally have some bearing on
whether there was an unnatural disposition of the testatrix's property.").
58. See, e.g., Smith v. Estate of Harrison, 498 So. 2d 1231, 1232-33 (Miss. 1986)
(invalidating on undue influence grounds a will that devised an elderly, physically disabled
testator's estate to neighbors who had "waited upon and looked after" the testator for two
years, "attended to his physical needs," taken care of his financial affairs, and "do[ne]
whatever else [he] required"). As a result, the estate passed by intestate succession to the
testator's adopted daughter who had lived in another state for forty years and seldom
visited her father. Id. at 1232-33. See generally WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 229
(discussing undue influence cases involving caregivers); Thornley, supra note 49, passim
(arguing that acts of care become evidence of undue influence). In cases of family
misconduct, however, courts often rule in favor of caregivers. See, e.g., Mason v. Estate of
Reitz, No. CA 92-637, 1993 WL 57687 *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1993) (rejecting
daughter's undue influence challenge to will leaving bulk of estate to a friend, Janette
Stillman, who cared for testator). The court stated:
This Court firmly believes that natural family should inherit and when there is
nothing such as neglect and abandonment involved, then undue influence is
easier to find. But people have the right to love, respond to, and appreciate
whomever they please. Karen Mason neglected her own mother so badly that
the wedge was driven between them by circumstances, not Janette Stillman.
Such a shame!!
Id. at "2. Moreover, if the testator is not survived by nuclear family members, courts are
more likely to reject claims that will provisions in favor of caregivers, close friends, or
partners are "unnatural." Rogers v. Crisp, 406 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ark. 1966) ("Nor can it
be said to be abnormal or unnatural for a testator, without wife or children, to leave
property to a good friend, rather than to a collateral relative."); see also Estate of Sarabia,
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true of bequests in amounts that deviate from intestate succession
patterns. 9
Long-term support and care of the decedent do not merely go
unrewarded. They actually count against the caregiver in cases
involving "unnatural" will provisions or contracts to devise. Long-
term support and care suggest a "confidential relationship" between
decedent and claimant and put the burden on the caregiver to satisfy
the court that she did not exploit her position to profit from an
enfeebled testator. 60
In its treatment of incomplete or ambiguous wills, the inheritance
system only reinforces this preferred scheme for reallocation of
wealth. Courts supposedly abhor61 intestacy and make every effort
270 Cal. Rptr. 560,565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting testator's brother's claim that will in
favor of testator's partner was an "unnatural will"); Mitchell v. Hillsman, 244 S.E.2d 871,
872 (Ga. 1978) (rejecting nieces' claim that will in favor of testator's close friend who "had
lived with the testatrix for more than seven years, up to her death, and had taken care of
the household and financial affairs of the testatrix without compensation" was an
"'unnatural' disposition of the testatrix' estate to a nonrelative, rather than her living
relatives").
59. See Fletcher v. DeLoach, 360 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala. 1978) (characterizing a will
leaving entire estate to daughter and making no provision for son or granddaughter as an
"unnatural disposition"). The court additionally stated that:
An unequal disposition of property per se raises no presumption... of
testamentary incapacity, nor is it per se unnatural; but the unequal treatment of
those who ostensibly have equal claims upon the testator's bounty, or the
preference of one to the exclusion of another, may under the circumstances of a
particular case, be deemed unnatural. In such a case, an unnatural disposition is
a fact to be ascertained and considered by the jury [on the issue of testamentary
capacity].
Id.; see also Frolik, supra note 34, at 877, 880 ("When the testamentary pattern of a will
violates [the] ... norm [of equal division among children], eyebrows are lifted and
questions are asked.... Disproportionate gifts to relatives can also trigger undue
influence claims."). Where one child is the testator's primary caregiver, however, courts
are more likely to be sympathetic to an unequal disposition of property. See In re Estate
of Tipp, 933 P.2d 182, 186 (Mont. 1997) (rejecting an undue influence challenge to will
leaving bulk of estate to one of seven children and concluding that disposition was not
unnatural because beneficiary was testator's primary caregiver).
60. See Thornley, supra note 49, at 516 ("[C]ourts frequently translate acts of care into
evidence that the one-caring unduly influenced the cared-for, or, worse yet, courts use
caring acts to support a presumption of undue influence."). For example, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court relied on the sole will beneficiary's testimony that for the eight years she
had lived with the elderly decedent, who was "'alone, in frail health, and... unable to
care for himself,'" she "cooked for [him], cleaned the house, bathed him, gave him
medicine, transported him to the doctor, and grocery shopped with her own money." In re
Estate of Beal, 769 P.2d 150, 152 (Okla. 1989). The court held this was "irresistable"
evidence that she enjoyed a confidential relationship with the decedent that allowed her to
exercise undue influence over him. Id. at 155-56.
61. Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 720, 9 S.E.2d 420, 424 (1940) (" 'An intestacy
is a dernier ressort in the construction of wills, and it has been said that the abhorrence of
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possible to read the will to avoid even partial intestacy of the
testator's estate. In reality, however, courts often use intestate
succession statutes as their charter to determine the likely, most
"natural" intent of the testator.62 They are inclined to uphold wills
that leave property to natural objects of the testator's bounty and to
void those wills that do not. As a result, the sacred canon of will
construction, the "presumption against intestacy," is effectively
nullified by the "equally potent" presumption that an intestate heir
can be disinherited only by plain words or necessary implication. 63
Lapse rules further promote distribution to the testator's closest
family members. Unless the will states otherwise, a devise to a
legatee who predeceases the testator lapses (fails) rather than passes
to that legatee's heirs or will beneficiaries.' 4 There is a notable
exception, however. Most jurisdictions have enacted antilapse
provisions that will "save" the devise65 and substitute another taker
courts to intestacy under a will may be likened to the abhorrence of nature to a
vacuum.' ") (citation omitted).
62. In re Estate of Walters, 519 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
"where the intent of the testator remains in doubt, a construction should be used which
considers the natural impulses of people and disposes of property in the same manner the
law would, had the decedent died intestate"). See JOSEPH M. DODGE, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 309 (1988)
(stating that "a court may well consider the objective circumstances of the testator, his
property, and the natural objects of his bounty at the time the will was executed in order
to determine whether a patent or latent ambiguity exists").
63. In re Rouse's Estate, 87 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1952) (stating that the presumption
against intestacy "is met by an equally potent presumption that an heir is not to be
disinherited except by plain words or necessary implication"); see also WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 442 (1988) ("There is a constructional preference against
disinheriting the testator's heirs, which arguably cancels out any presumption against
intestacy."). Similarly, where wills refer broadly to "relatives" or "family," legislatures
and courts have used intestacy statutes as their guide. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-
1(c) (Michie Supp. 2000) (stating that a devise to" 'heirs,' or 'next of kin,' or 'relatives,' or
'family,' or to 'the persons thereunto entitled under the intestate laws' or to persons
described by words of similar import, shall mean those persons, including the spouse, who
would take under the intestate laws . . ."); Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170 (N.H. 1926)
(citing cases in which courts construed " 'relatives' or 'relations' ... to mean those who
would take under statutes of distribution or descent"); In re Will of Casey, 564 N.Y.S.2d
669, 673 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1990) (defining "relatives" as those who would take under
intestacy law).
64. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 438-39 ("If a devisee does not
survive the devise lapses (i.e., fails). All gifts made by will are subject to a requirement
that the devisee survive the testator, unless the testator specifies otherwise.").
65. States that have adopted the most recent version of the Uniform Probate Code
explicitly extend antilapse rules to will substitutes and future interests as well. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-706 & cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 192 (1998) ("provid[ing] an
antilapse statute for 'beneficiary designations' " in will substitutes); id § 2-707 & cmt.
(amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 197 (1998) ("project[ing] the antilapse idea into the area of
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under certain circumstances.66 Generally, they limit this relief,
however, to cases where the deceased legatee was a close blood
relative of the decedent, survived by issue.67
Inheritance law even goes to the extreme of defining wills as
outdated to ensure disposition to "natural objects of the decedent's
bounty." If the testator fails to update a will to reflect changes in
marital status or the birth or adoption of a child, legislatures and
courts usually presume oversight rather than design, and they once
again impose the preferred estate distribution scheme-to the
testator's closest family members.' Under "omitted spouse" and
"pretermitted child" statutes, courts generally award intestate shares
to post-will69 spouses and children.70 Likewise, in the case of a post-
future interests"). The Uniform Probate Code's (U.P.C.) antilapse provision covers
devises to deceased stepchildren as well as close blood or adoptive relatives. See iL § 2-
603(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 165 (1998) (applying to a deceased devisee who was the
testator's grandparent, descendant of a grandparent, or stepchild). For an extended
discussion of antilapse statutes, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 (1999).
66. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 439 ("In nearly all states, however,
antilapse statutes have been enacted which, under certain specified circumstances,
substitute another beneficiary for the predeceased devisee.").
67. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 (McKinney 1998) (limiting
antilapse provisions to a deceased beneficiary who was the testator's issue, brother or
sister survived by issue); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-106 (Lexis 2001) (limiting antilapse
provisions to a deceased devisee who was the testator's grandparent or lineal descendent
of a grandparent survived by issue). Some antilapse statutes do apply more broadly to
nonrelatives as well. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (2001) (allowing
heirs or devisees of any devisee who predeceases the testator after will execution to take
the devise). For a chart of various patterns of antilapse statutes, see WAGGONER ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 359 (updating chart in Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt
Instruments: A Blueprintfor Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335,375 (1985)).
68. These protections generally are not available, however, if the testator
intentionally omitted a spouse or children or provided for them outside the will. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 43-8-90 (Supp. 2001) (providing an intestate share to an omitted spouse
"unless it appears from the will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided
for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a
testamentary provision be reasonably proven"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-103 (1984 &
Supp. 2000) (awarding an intestate share to a pretermitted child "not provided for nor
disinherited, but only pretermitted, in such will, and not provided for by settlement made
by the testator in his lifetime"). In both the omitted spouse and pretermitted child
contexts, however, legislatures and courts have adopted a variety of approaches to
determine what constitutes intentional disinheritance. For a summary of these
approaches, see ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS,
AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 169-72 (4th ed. 1999).
69. Some pretermitted child statutes apply to omitted children born or adopted prior
to the will as well. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-407(b) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2001)
(awarding an intestate share to a child or issue of a deceased child alive at the time of will
execution "whom the testator shall omit to mention or to provide for, either specifically or
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will divorce, inheritance law presumes that the testator intended to
sever all ties with the former spouse. Because the divorced spouse is
by society's definition no longer a "natural object of the decedent's
bounty,"71 will revocation statutes and doctrines "rescue" the testator
by declaring all will provisions in favor of the divorced spouse (and,
increasingly, relatives of the divorced spouse as well 72) null and void.73
C. Contracts to Devise
The family paradigm also impedes contractual efforts to induce
and acknowledge support. U.S. inheritance law disfavors contracts to
devise between decedents and caregivers.74 Legislatures and courts
as a member of a class").
70. Some pretermitted child statutes apply also to the issue of a deceased child. See,
e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 20 (Law. Co-op. 1994) (awarding an intestate share to a
child or issue of a deceased child "unless they have been provided for by the testator in his
lifetime or unless it appears that the omission was intentional and not occasioned by
accident or mistake"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-23 (1995 & Supp. 2000) (awarding an
intestate share to a child or issue of a deceased child "unless it appears that the omission
was intentional and not occasioned by accident or mistake").
71. Peevy v. Mutual Servs. Cas. Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. 1984) (stating
that an "ex-spouse loses status as one entitled to support" because "the legislature may
have recognized that most ex-spouses would not be a 'natural object of decedent's
bounty' ").
72. The Uniform Probate Code revokes "any disposition or appointment created by
law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse."
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 217 (1998). It defines
"relative of the divorced individual's former spouse" as "an individual who is related to
the divorced individual's former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity, and who, after the
divorce or annulment, is not related to the divorced individual by blood, adoption, or
affinity." Id. § 2-804(a)(5) (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 2001). For examples of
statutes that have adopted these provisions, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-804 (2000);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-804 (Michie 1995).
73. See Russell v. Johnston, 327 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1982) ("The legislature
obviously recognized that due to the change in the family structure new moral duties and
obligations may have evolved subsequent to the execution of the will, and that due to the
turmoil of a dissolution an automatic revocation is in the best interest of the testator.").
Most courts even apply revocation-upon-divorce provisions to wills executed prior to
marriage. In re Estate of Forrest, 706 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) ("adopt[ing]
the view taken by the majority of courts from other jurisdictions and hold[ing] that the
revocation by divorce provision of the Act applies to a disposition to a former spouse,
whether the testator executed his will before or after marriage to the beneficiary"). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 4.1(b) & cmt. o (1999) (discussing revocation by dissolution of marriage under non-
U.P.C. approaches).
74. Craddock v. Berryman, 645 P.2d 399,402 (Mont. 1982) (stating that "[c]ontracts to
make wills are looked upon with disfavor"); Bentzen v. Demmons, 842 P.2d 1015, 1020
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[w]hile equity will recognize oral contracts to devise,
such contracts are not favored").
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regard these arrangements with such "misgivings and suspicion"'75 that
they impose high evidentiary standards for enforcement.76
Contractual caregivers also face fraud, duress, and undue influence
challenges.77 Like "unnatural" will beneficiaries,78 their very acts of
care raise the specter of exploitation. 9
Even family members can fall victim to the family paradigm
when they claim a support contract entitlement to more than their
intestate share. Under a model of "natural" family behavior,
75. Fahringer v. Estate of Strine, 216 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 1966) ("[T]raditionally the
courts have been reluctant to give recognition to such contracts and have viewed claims
based on such contracts with misgivings and suspicion."); see also Eggers v. Rittscher, 529
N.W.2d 741, 744 (Neb. 1995) ("We regard with grave suspicion any claim of an oral
contract to convey property at death.").
76. Many statutes require that proof of a contract to devise must appear in writing.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-107 (1984 & Supp. 2000) (stating that a contract to
devise "can be established only by: (1) Provisions of a will stating material provisions of
the contract; (2) An express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving
the terms of the contract; or (3) A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the
contract"). Jurisdictions that allow oral contracts to devise impose strict evidentiary
standards. See, e.g., Kahn v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 576 N.E.2d 321,324 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) ("[E]vidence of the existence of the contract and its terms must be clear and explicit
and 'so convincing that it will leave no doubt in the mind of the court.' ") (citation
omitted); Thompson v. Henderson, 591 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that
oral contracts to devise "are regarded with suspicion" and that "[t]he standard of proof in
such cases is not 'a preponderance of the evidence' but rather, one of 'high probability' ")
(citation omitted). Dead man's statutes have posed particular problems for contracts to
devise. See, e.g., Farah v. Stout, 684 A.2d 471, 474-77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(construing strictly Maryland's dead man's statute to exclude the only evidence of a
contract to devise between decedent and caregiver). Failure to satisfy statutory or judicial
evidentiary requirements for enforcement of contracts to devise does not necessarily leave
the claimant without remedy, however. The claimant may still be entitled to recover in
quantum meruit the reasonable value of services rendered. See Williams v. Mason, 556 So.
2d 1045, 1051 (Miss. 1990) (rejecting a claim for specific performance of an oral contract to
devise but supporting a quantum meruit claim for the reasonable value of services
rendered on grounds that "neither the statute of frauds nor the statute of wills per se
preclude quantum meruit recovery in such circumstances"); see also UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-514 cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 160 (1998) (stating that section 2-514, which
requires written evidence of contract to devise, "does not preclude recovery in quantum
meruit for the value of services rendered the testator"). For an extended discussion of
possible remedies, see Daniel S. Field, Note, Will Contracts for Personal Services and Real
Property During the Lifetime of the Aging Devisor: Resolving the Continuing Dilemma, 11
PROB. L.J. 57, 68-81 (1992).
77. For a detailed survey and analysis of undue influence, fraud, and duress cases
involving caregivers, see Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Contracts to Devise or Gift Property in
Exchange for Lifetime Home Care-Latent and Insidious Abuse of Older Persons, 12
PROB. L.J. 1, 15-31 (1994).
78. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
79. In specific cases, these suspicions of exploitation may in fact be well founded. For
grim examples of mistreatment by caregivers of dependent elderly patients or relatives,
see Kruse, supra note 77, at 15-31.
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inheritance law presumes that their support services were gratuitous
rather than contractual,8 rendered out of "love and affection without
expectation of payment."81 Traditional notions of family structure
and values' may also defeat the contractual rights of caregivers who
shared a nonmarital sexual as well as support relationship with the
decedent. Courts may invalidate such contracts on public policy
grounds for "illegal" consideration.'
80. See, e.g., In re Clark's Estate, 267 N.W. 273, 275 (Wis. 1936). In what it
acknowledged to be "concededly a hard case," the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the
contractual claim of a niece who had lived with the decedent since she was an infant, "was
regarded by the deceased as his daughter," and had furnished room, board, and continual
care to the decedent during the final six years of his life. Id. As the court put it, "[h]ad she
been a daughter she could have done no more for him." Id. Nonetheless, the court
rejected her claim because of the "settled" presumption that services rendered by" 'near
relatives by blood or marriage [who] reside together as one common family... [are]
intended as mutual acts of kindness done or furnished gratuitously.'" Id (quoting In re
Estate of Goltz, 238 N.W. 374, 376 (Wis. 1931)). As a result, the decedent's estate passed
by intestate succession to "blood relatives of the deceased [who] were apparently
indifferent to his welfare." Id.; see also Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 17, 19-20
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the contractual claim of a spouse who, in exchange for her
husband's oral promise to devise property to her, provided round-the-clock nursing care
for her husband who wanted to live at home rather than in a nursing home after his
stroke). In a stinging dissent, Justice Poch characterized the "anomalous rule" followed
by the majority as "coerced altruism," based on an outdated view of marriage and the
economic role of women in contemporary society. Id at 25 (Poch6, J., dissenting). Justice
Poch6 wrote, "Apparently, in the majority's view she had a pre-existing or pre-contract
nondelegable duty to clean the bedpans herself.... To contend in 1993 that such a
contract is without consideration means that if Mrs. Clinton becomes ill, President Clinton
must drop everything and personally care for her." Id. at 20, 24 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
For an extended discussion of the family services presumption and its applicability to
nonrelated cohabitants as well as relatives, see In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697,
702-04 (Wis. 1980).
81. In re Estate of Barr, 658 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1997) (rejecting a
contract claim for services to the decedent married to the claimants' uncle).
82. See Steffes, 290 N.W.2d at 712 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (arguing that enforcement of
a contract to devise between parties who lived in an adulterous relationship "can only
serve to accelerate the growth of the self-destructive cancer of the 70's 'immorality' and
the decline of the family. If there is to be a direct, frontal assault on the traditional values,
principles, ideals and pattern of family life, the very lifeline and backbone of our
American society, it should be accomplished within the confines of the legislative halls-
not in the courts.").
83. "[U]nlawful sexual intercourse is not considered consideration, and a contract
based upon such a relationship will not be enforced." JOHN T. GAUBATZ ET AL.,
ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 207 (1989). Courts have
allowed recovery under contracts to devise between lovers in situations where the "illicit
relations were no part of the contract, and were no more than an incidental part of the
plaintiff's performance." Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691, 696-97 (Mass. 1975). For
other examples of cases permitting recovery by unmarried cohabitants, see WAGGONER
ET AL., supra note 5, at 95-96.
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Even when courts are willing to recognize support-based
contracts, the claimant may be squeezed out of the estate distribution
by the decedent's closest family members. That is because, in many
jurisdictions, the statutory rights of surviving spouses 4 and children 85
automatically supersede the contract rights of even the most
deserving claimant. Thus, in the contractual context too, the family
paradigm may well trump support.
D. Will Substitutes
Nonprobate transfers, such as inter vivos gifts, revocable trusts,
insurance, joint tenancies, and payable-on-death contracts, are
supposed to avoid the costs and strictures of the inheritance system.6
Yet, even these will substitutes are vulnerable to the family paradigm.
As in the case of wills' 7 and contracts to devise,88 courts may use
mental capacity doctrines to invalidate nonprobate efforts to
recognize support needs or contributions outside the family.8 9 In
84. Many courts have explicitly cited the public policy in favor of marriage to give the
surviving spouse's elective share or omitted spouse rights priority over the rights of
contract beneficiaries. See, e.g., Via v. Putnam, 656 So. 2d 460, 466 (Fla. 1995) (citing the
"public policy of protecting the surviving spouse of the marriage contract" to give
statutory rights of an omitted spouse priority over contractual rights of third-party
beneficiaries); Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (Md. 1989) ("[T]he public policy
surrounding the marriage relationship also suggests that the surviving spouse's claim to an
elective share should be afforded priority over the claims of beneficiaries of a contract to
make a will."). Other courts, however, reject this view and give priority to the claims of
contract beneficiaries. CLARK ET AL., supra note 68, at 344. For a review of various
approaches, see Via, 656 So. 2d at 464-65; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 63, at 392-93;
WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 603; Carolyn L. Dessin, The Troubled Relationship of
Will Contracts and Spousal Protection: Time for an Amicable Separation, 45 CATH. U. L.
REv. 435,455-68 (1996).
85. "After-born children of the promisor may also be protected if full enforcement of
a contract would deprive them of any share of their father's estate." MCGOVERN ET AL.,
supra note 63, at 393. See, e.g., In re Estate of Sherry, 698 P.2d 94, 95 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (rejecting specific performance of the decedent's contract to make a will in favor of
children of his first marriage, which would exclude minor children of the decedent's
second marriage from a share of his estate).
86. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 403-04 (stating that will substitutes are
"referred to as probate-avoidance devices"). For an extended discussion of will
substitutes, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law
of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 passim (1984).
87. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
89. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 63, at 294-95 (discussing and citing mental
capacity challenges to will substitutes); Sherman, supra note 55, at 262-66 (arguing that a
"homosexual settlor must be as concerned about charges of undue influence as is the
homosexual testator"); Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 286 (stating
that "will substitutes are subject to the same grounds of attack as are testamentary
transfers"). Some commentators claim will substitutes are " 'more resistant' to capacity
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addition, legislatures and courts increasingly subordinate will
substitutes to the surviving spouse's marital property rights.90 Recent
reforms, especially those patterned on the Uniform Probate Code,91
have only reinforced this family emphasis. For example, several
states now extend antilapse and automatic revocation-upon-divorce
provisions to nonprobate transfers as well as wills 2
E. Statutory Support Provisions
This is not to say that the American inheritance system fails to
recognize support altogether. It does promote support but limits its
protections once again principally to the "natural objects of the
decedent's bounty," the decedent's closest surviving family members.
Through omitted spouse, elective share, community property, probate
exemption, and family allowance provisions, inheritance law provides
safeguards for the surviving spouse.93 In practice, however, these
provisions may prove inadequate to address the support needs of the
surviving spouse as well as the nonspouse because they too
implement preexisting notions of appropriate wealth distribution at
the expense of individual need. Omitted spouse94 and marital
property schemes award property mechanically on the basis of fixed
rules, with virtually no consideration for the actual circumstances or
and undue influence challenges." Jan Ellen Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention:
Grounds for Upsetting Wills and Will Substitutes, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 66 (1984-1985)
[hereinafter Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention] (discussing "[t]he theory... that
lifetime transfers are 'more resistant' to capacity and undue influence challenges") (citing
John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 67
(1978)); see also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 393 ("[A] revocable trust,
like a will, can be contested for lack of mental capacity and undue influence[;] [i]n
practice, however, it is more difficult to set aside a funded revocable trust than a will on
these grounds.").
90. For an extended discussion of statutes and cases, see DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON,
supra note 15, at 500-17; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 63, at 118-22,140-43.
91. This extension of wills doctrines and rules to will substitutes is part of a larger
trend in the Uniform Probate Code to integrate laws governing both probate and
nonprobate transfers. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Will Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1123
passim (1993).
92. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.804 (Lexis 2000); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-804
(2000); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. p (1999) (stating that revocation by dissolution of marriage
principles "also apply to a donative transfer in the form of a will substitute").
93. For a summary of these provisions, see DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note
15, at 471-536.
94. Omitted spouse statutes generally provide the qualifying post-will spouse with an
intestate share of the decedent's estate. See supra note 68.
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needs of the surviving spouse.' Similarly, probate exemption and
family allowance provisions may offer only short-term, minimal levels
of support inadequate for the needs of the particular spouse.
96
The existing protections for the decedent's children are even
more flawed from a support standpoint. Under American inheritance
law, parents can disinherit their children-even minor, disabled, and
unborn children-without cause or remedy.9  Pretermitted child
statutes may cover unintentionally disinherited children. 9 Like
omitted spouse provisions, however, these statutes make no
adjustment for individual support needs.99 They simply award
95. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 532 (arguing that "[c]onventional
elective-share law['s] ... fixed fraction, whether it is the typical one-third or some other
fraction, disregards the survivor's actual needs"). This statement applies as well to
community property schemes. For example, the elderly disinherited survivor of a short-
term, late-in-life marriage receives only one-half of assets accumulated during marriage
even if that spouse was entirely dependent on the decedent's support during the
decedent's lifetime. The most recent Uniform Probate Code version of the elective share
provides only minimal concession to support by granting a needy surviving spouse a
"supplemental elective-share amount" of up to $50,000. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
202(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998). Even proponents of this scheme have
acknowledged its drawbacks. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 12, at 320-21 (drafters of
U.P.C. elective share provisions recognizing that proposed scheme, like all forced-share
systems, is "mechanical" and "intrinsically arbitrary" and thus "would not achieve perfect
justice").
96. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-101(a) (2001) (awarding a surviving spouse an
"allowance out of the personal estate of the decedent of the sum of $10,000 for the
personal use of himself and of minor children"); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-4-1 (Michie
Supp. 2000) (granting a surviving spouse an allowance of $15,000 claimable against "the
personal property of the estate or a residence of the surviving spouse, or a combination of
both"); see also J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be
Retained?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 223, 247 (1987-88) [hereinafter Oldham, Should the
Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be Retained?] (arguing that family allowance "systems
seem quite inadequate to satisfy this function... because under current systems support
for the survivor normally ceases one year after the death of the decedent").
97. Louisiana is the only state that protects children from intentional disinheritance.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 536 ("In all states except Louisiana, a child
or other descendant has no statutory protection against disinheritance by a parent.").
Louisiana provides a forced share for children who "are twenty-three years of age or
younger or [who] ... because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates." LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 1493(A) (West 2000). In a landmark recent decision the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts took the first step toward protecting children from disinheritance.
L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Mass. 2000). It held that "[a] parent charged with
an obligation to support his child cannot nullify that legal obligation by disinheriting his
child .... Id
98. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
99. One notable exception to the fixed share approach is Wisconsin's pretermitted
child statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.25(d)(5) (West Supp. 2000) (giving state courts
discretionary power to depart from statutory pretermitted child share if "the court
determines that the share is in a different amount or form from what the testator would
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predetermined shares of the estate to qualifying children.100 Probate
exemption and family allowance provisions may extend some relief to
the decedent's surviving children as well as spouse.'0' These limited
safeguards often are available solely to the decedent's minor children,
however.1°2  Many statutes disregard altogether the equally
compelling needs of physically or mentally disabled adult children.03
Thus, under the inheritance system, support may ultimately prove
illusory even for the decedent's closest family members.'04
have wanted to provide for the omitted child or issue of a deceased child"). Even this
discretionary provision, however, does not explicitly address support needs of the
pretermitted child. Instead, its principal focus is "intent of the testator." Id. ("[T]he court
may in its final judgment make such provision for the omitted child or issue out of the
estate as it deems would best accord with the intent of the ... testator.").
100. Pretermitted children generally receive intestate shares. This amount may vary,
however, if, for example, the testator provided for other children in the will or is survived
by a spouse. For a summary of common patterns, see ROGER W. ANDERSEN,
UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 200 (2d ed. 1999).
101. For a review of the basic patterns of such statutes and their impact on the
decedent's children, see MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 63, at 102-06.
102. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 286 (Vernon 2001) (awarding family
allowance to the surviving spouse and minor children for one year after the decedent's
death); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-7-501 (Lexis 2001) (awarding homestead, wearing apparel,
household furniture, and support provision to the spouse or minor children). Some
statutes permit only unmarried minor children to take. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-
2-102 (Supp. 2000) (providing support allowance to the surviving spouse and unmarried
minor children). Others allow minor children to take only if there is no surviving spouse.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-101 (2001) (awarding family allowance to minor children
"when there is no surviving spouse").
103. Some statutes extend rights to both minor children and "dependent" children.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN § 45-2-402 (Michie 1995) (providing family allowance to "each
minor child and each dependent child of the decedent" if no surviving spouse). Others
follow the U.P.C. model and cover both "minor children whom the decedent was
obligated to support, and children who were in fact being supported by the decedent."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-404 (West Supp. 2001) (providing a family allowance
provision). Except for Louisiana, California provides the most extensive coverage of
children. Under its family allowance provision, the surviving spouse, minor children, and
"[a]dult children of the decedent who are physically or mentally incapacitated from
earning a living and were actually dependent in whole or in part upon the decedent for
support" are entitled to an allowance. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540(a) (West 1991 & Supp.
2001). "Other adult children of the decedent who were actually dependent in whole or in
part upon the decedent for support" may receive a family allowance at the court's
discretion. Id. § 6540(b)(1).
104. The situation for other family and nonrelated dependents is even worse. Even
elderly, disabled parents receive no guaranteed protection from intentional or
unintentional disinheritance. California does give the court discretion to award a family
allowance to "[a] parent of the decedent who was actually dependent in whole or in part
upon the decedent for support." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540(b)(2) (West 1991 & Supp.
2001). Florida extends family allowance rights to "lineal heirs" (including both "lineal
ascendants and lineal descendants of the decedent") "whom the decedent was obligated to
support or who were in fact being supported by him." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.403 (West
Supp. 2001). Even these provisions offer only limited safeguards. California awards a
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II. THE LIMITS OF SCHOLARLY REFORM STRATEGIES
The failure of American inheritance law to realize its social
welfare goals has not escaped the notice of the academic community.
Legal scholars have offered a wide variety of proposals to address
defects in existing rules and doctrines. 5 Close analysis reveals that
these proposals take the form of three broad strategies. They seek to
(1) enhance protections for surviving family members; (2) redefine
the family to reflect changes in modem American society; or (3)
introduce procedural mechanisms to mitigate the effects of the family
paradigm on wills that deviate from "natural" intestacy patterns.
Even if adopted, these strategies would offer only partial solutions.
As this Part will show, scholarly reform strategies share the
fundamental flaw of the inheritance system itself. They too remain
rooted in the family paradigm.
A. Enhancing Protections for Surviving Family Members
The first strategy has targeted gaps in existing protections for the
decedent's surviving family members. Reformers have focused
particular attention on the plight of disinherited minor children'016 and
family allowance during estate administration only (and for no more than a year). CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 6540(b), 6543 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001). Florida provides that its
"allowance shall not exceed a total of $6000." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732A03 (West Supp.
2001); see 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 226, § 40 (amending family allowance maximum from $6000
to $18,000).
105. This is not to suggest that all of these proposals are designed exclusively or even
principally to address support flaws. For example, proponents of schemes to protect
nonconforming wills from mental capacity challenges cite donative freedom and fairness
as their major goals. At the same time, however, these schemes also respond to a
significant impediment to support by promoting testamentary efforts to recognize support
needs and contributions by claimants outside societal definitions of natural objects of the
decedent's bounty. In the marital property rights area, some reformers even explicitly
reject a support rationale for proposals that could effectively improve the financial
position of a needy surviving spouse. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 137, 151 (arguing that
support rationale for marital property rights is "patriarchal" and "wholly consistent with
the maintenance (or vessel) ideology of the fourteenth century").
106. Reformers have emphasized that the approach taken in the United States stands
in marked contrast to that of the rest of the world. Brashier, Disinheritance and the
Modern Family, supra note 13, at 117 n.111 ("Most of the civilized countries in the world
provide direct protection from disinheritance to children of a testator."); Paul G. Haskell,
Restraints Upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY, supra note 19, at 105, 114-15 (discussing the "mysterious absence of
protection" in the United States for disinherited minor children). For an extended
discussion and explanation of "why U.S. policy toward the inheritance rights of children
remains so different from that of almost all other developed nations," see J. Thomas
Oldham, What Does the U.S. System Regarding Inheritance Rights of Children Reveal
About American Families?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 265,265 (1999).
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have offered innovative proposals inspired principally by foreign
models.0 7 These include modified forced heirship provisions that
would automatically entitle a minor child to a share of her parent's
estate,0 s discretionary schemes that would allow the court to tailor
relief to address the specific needs and circumstances of the
disinherited child,109 and creation of a posthumous parental obligation
to support minor children.110 While most proposals address the plight
of disinherited minor children only,' others extend protection to
adult children as well.
1 2
The precarious position of the surviving spouse has also
generated considerable scholarly concern. Reformers have
responded with calls for increased intestate shares for surviving
spouses, n ' more generous probate exemption and allowance
107. See Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from
China, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 1199, 1207-17 [hereinafter Foster, Linking Support and
Inheritance] (discussing the influence of foreign models on reform proposals to address
support flaws in U.S. inheritance system).
108. See, e.g., Batts, supra note 13, at 1253-63 (proposing a protective inheritance
system, a modified version of forced heirship approach); Paul G. Haskell, The Power of
Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L-i. 499, 518-26 (1964) (recommending a
revised forced heirship scheme). In addition, scholars have responded critically to recent
reforms in Louisiana that have reduced forced heirship (legitime) protections for
disinherited children. See, e.g., Cynthia Samuel, Letter from Louisiana: An Obituary for
Forced Heirship and a Birth Announcement for Covenant Marriage, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV.
L.F. 183, 183-89 (1997) (criticizing 1995-96 legislative changes to forced heirship in
Louisiana); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable
"Revolution" Completed, 57 LA. L. REv. 55 passim (1996) (providing extensive critical
analysis of Louisiana's legislative reforms of forced heirship).
109. See, e.g., Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child, supra note 13, at 32-35
(proposing a discretionary scheme based on the British Columbia approach); Edwin M.
Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family Maintenance: A Proposal for
Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 231, 256-58 (1962) (calling for the adoption of
discretionary family maintenance legislation based on the British Commonwealth model);
Jan Ellen Rein, A More Rational System for the Protection of Family Members Against
Disinheritance: A Critique of Washington's Pretermitted Child Statute and Other Matters,
15 GONZ. L. REV. 11, 44-55 (1979) [hereinafter Rein, Protection of Family Members]
(proposing a discretionary approach based on the New Zealand model).
110. See, e.g., HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 38-44 (1981) (proposing a posthumous duty to support minor children);
Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, supra note 13, at 173-80 (advocating a
posthumous obligation to support minor children).
111. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 1066, 1110-11 (1980) [hereinafter Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate]
(proposing a forced share for minor children and expressly "exclud[ing] adult children").
112. See, e.g., Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child, supra note 13, at 21-24
(discussing arguments for protecting adult as well as minor children).
113. For a sampling of the literature, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 & cmt., 8
U.L.A. 81 (1998) (increasing the surviving spouse's intestate share and citing numerous
empirical studies and articles supporting this result).
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provisions T 4and expanded omitted spouse protections. 15 They have
placed particular emphasis on flaws in existing marital property rights
schemes. Reformers have made a concerted effort to close the
loopholes that effectively allow disinheritance of spouses through
inter vivos transfers of assets out of the estate.1 6 They have also
attacked the "underlying architecture' 1 7 of marital property rights
schemes, especially elective share statutes.118  Recognizing that
arbitrary, fixed fractions may prove inadequate to meet the surviving
spouse's needs, they have offered radically different responses.
Proposals include a larger elective share of the estate,119 a guaranteed
"minimum share for the impoverished survivor," 2' a flexible,
equitable distribution scheme,'21 and an abandonment of the forced
114. See, e.g., Carolyn S. Bratt, Family Protection Under Kentucky's Inheritance Laws:
Is the Family Really Protected?, 76 KY. L.J. 387, 444-55 (1987-88) (proposing reforms of
Kentucky's "inadequate" homestead and personalty exemptions); Oldham, Should the
Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be Retained?, supra note 96, at 251-53 (proposing a
modified life estate probate homestead scheme).
115. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Kazimer, Comment, The Problem of the "Un-omitted"
Spouse Under Section 2-301 of the Uniform Probate Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 481,498-507
(1985) (proposing a "testator's intent standard" to determine whether omitted spouse
provisions extend to a surviving spouse who is a beneficiary of an antenuptial will).
116. See Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate
Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 passim (1977)
(discussing efforts to protect surviving spouses from disinheritance through lifetime
transfers); Helene S. Shapo, The Widow's Mite Gets Smaller: Deficiencies in Illinois
Elective Share Law, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 119-20 (1999) (proposing reforms to Illinois
elective share law to include inter vivos transfers).
117. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 12, at 303.
118. Although elective share schemes have borne the brunt of the attack, community
property schemes also have significant support flaws. See supra note 95.
119. See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 12, at 316 (proposing an increase in
the elective share from one-third to one-half).
120. Id. at 319. Professors Langbein and Waggoner proposed, id., and the revised
version of the Uniform Probate Code adopted a supplemental elective share amount of
$50,000 to address a surviving spouse's actual support needs. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-202(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998). Professor Waggoner has argued,
however, that this figure is "too low" and that "[a] somewhat higher figure might be quite
appropriate." Waggoner, supra note 11, at 56.
121. See, e.g., W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 301-27 (1960)
(proposing equitable distribution legislation based on the English model); Rein, Protection
of Family Members, supra note 109, at 44-55 (proposing an equitable distribution scheme
based on the New Zealand model); Peter H. Strott, Note, Preventing Spousal
Disinheritance in Georgia, 19 GA. L. REv. 427, 446-47 (1985) (calling for extension to
Georgia probate law of divorce law's equitable division of marital property); see also
Helene S. Shapo, "A Tale of Two Systems": Anglo-American Problems in the
Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REv. 707, 781 (1993) [hereinafter
Shapo, A Tale of Two Systems] (concluding from study of the English equitable
distribution scheme that the United States should introduce "some degree of flexibility"
and judicial discretion to address the needs of the surviving spouse).
2001] FAMILY PARADIGM
share approach altogether2 or its replacement with the marital
sharing/partnership approach of community property."
Most proponents of enhanced protections for family members,
however, have confined their efforts to protecting only the decedent's
immediate family.1 24 As a result, they have failed to address the
situation of many potential victims of the vanishing extended
family"2 --the destitute parent, elderly grandparent, disabled sibling,
or infant grandchild-who "are often, in effect, homeless. 1 126 Only a
few scholars have responded to support needs that transcend nuclear
family boundaries. Professor Paul Haskell, for example, has
proposed a modified forced share scheme that would protect the
decedent's needy parents as well as children and spouse from
122. Some scholars, including those "who assume the purpose of the elective share is
spousal support, have questioned the need for an elective share" at all. DUKEMINIER &
JOHNANSON, supra note 15, at 480 n.1 (citing as examples Elias Clark, The Recapture of
Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent
Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REv. 513 (1970) and Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1966));
see also Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, 32 U. MIAMI
INST. ON EST. PLAN. 900 passim (1998) (discussing schemes for defeating the elective
share).
123. See, e.g., Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into
Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the
Deferred Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 488, 523-59 (2000)
(proposing a deferred-community property approach to incorporate the partnership
theory of marriage into elective share law); Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced
Share Be Retained?, supra note 96, at 233 (criticizing current forced share systems and
stating that the "community property concept of marital property rights" would best serve
the marital partnership concept). Professor Whitebread has criticized the Uniform
Probate Code elective share provisions, stating:
If America is really looking for a uniform system of marital property rights that
completely incorporates the partnership theory of marriage, eventually all states
will have to abandon elective or forced share law and adopt some sort of
community property system.
Charles H. Whitebread, The Uniform Probate Code's Nod to the Partnership Theory of
Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions, 11 PROB. L.J. 125, 142 (1992); see also
Waggoner, supra note 2, at 245-47 (discussing community property proposals and noting
two approaches exist--"the strict deferred-community approach" and "the elective-share
deferred-community approach"); Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of
Connecticut. Past, Present and Future, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 807, 810, 874-79 (concluding
that Connecticut should adopt some version of the community property model to
implement the concept of partnership in marriage).
124. Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, supra note 111, at 1111 (stating that her
"proposal rests on the conclusion that, after protecting the nuclear family, society has little
or no interest in imposing the requirement of mental competency").
125. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 96 (1990) ("As
the extended family vanishes, it leaves behind many victims.").
126. Id.
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disinheritance. 127 Other commentators, such as Professors Ronald
Chester" and Jan Ellen Rein, 129 have recommended adoption of
foreign family maintenance models that would give courts discretion
to provide relief to a wider circle of family dependents-the
decedent's spouse, children (including natural, adopted, illegitimate,
and stepchildren), grandchildren, and parents.13 In his radical
scheme to curtail inheritance,13' Professor Mark Ascher too expressly
recognized broader family support needs. He offered special tax
exemptions for the decedent's surviving spouse, ascendants,
dependent lineal descendants, and disabled lineal descendants.132
In keeping with the family paradigm, the claims of nonrelated
dependents have been virtually ignored under this first reform
strategy.133  The vast majority of commentators have favored a
"conclusive presumption of dependency based on certain familial
relationships"'' 34 rather than actual need of survivors.135  Even
127. Haskell, supra note 108, at 520-21.
128. Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child, supra note 13, passim (proposing
the adoption of the British Columbia model).
129. Rein, Protection of Family Members, supra note 109, at 47-55 (proposing the
adoption of the New Zealand model).
130. These are the conventional patterns of the Australian, New Zealand and most
Canadian models. For extended discussion of these models, see generally Joseph Laufer,
Flexible Restraints on 'Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family
Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277 (1955). There are variants, however. For
example, some maintenance statutes also cover a divorced spouse, grandparent, or
descendant dependent on the decedent for at least three years prior to the decedent's
death. See Carole 0. Davis, Comment, A Recommendation for Family Maintenance in the
United States: A Comparative Study of Canadian and American Provisions for Support of
Dependents, 2 CAN. AMER. L.J. 151, 166-69 (1984) (discussing Canadian approaches). A
few statutes even extend protection to nonrelated dependents. See id. (describing
Canadian approaches); Richard R. Schaul-Yoder, Note, British Inheritance Legislation:
Discretionary Distribution at Death, 8 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 205, 217-20 (1985)
(discussing the British approach).
131. Ascher, supra note 125, at 121-49.
132. See id. at 121-32.
133. For a notable exception, see Gaubatz, supra note 44. Professor Gaubatz argued
that because the "decedent's close family might include nonblood relatives and friends,....
those dependent upon the decedent at the time of his death under circumstances which
would lead to the expectation of continued support" should have both intestate rights and
protections from disinheritance. Id. at 559.
134. See, e.g., Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, supra note 111, at 1111 n.174
("I do not propose a statute that permits persons who show financial dependency upon the
testator to claim a share of the estate; that would encourage litigation and further
encumber probate administration. Rather, I propose a conclusive presumption of
dependency based on certain familial relationships.").
135. The "weight of opinion in this country opposes" adoption of a more flexible
scheme that would give courts discretion to tailor relief to actual need of survivors.
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 478. For the most devastating critique of
this approach, see Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
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proponents of the more flexible foreign family maintenance approach
have suggested a similar preference for family categories. They have
generally bypassed the liberal English model that covers all
dependents 36 in favor of status-based variants that extend remedies
to only the decedent's closest family members.37
Although many reformers have recognized the limits of their
approach to support, they have chosen to turn to a second reform
strategy rather than discard family categories.138 These reformers
have opted to remain within the family paradigm but adjust the
definition of the family to accommodate needs of contemporary
American society. As the next section will show, this strategy too
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986). See also Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 12, at 314 (opposing judicial discretion as a "terrible price" to pay
for family protection). For a summary of the literature and arguments against family
maintenance models, see Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 107, at
1204-05, 1214-16.
136. England's 1975 amended legislation covers the decedent's surviving spouse,
former spouse who has not remarried, children, persons treated by the decedent as
children during any of the decedent's marriages, and any person maintained in whole or in
part by the decedent immediately prior to the decedent's death. Inheritance (Provision
for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, c. 63, § 1(1)(a)-(e) (Eng.).
137. For example, Professor Rein proposed the New Zealand scheme that protects the
decedent's spouse, children (including natural, adopted, illegitimate, and stepchildren),
grandchildren, and parents. Rein, Protection of Family Members, supra note 109, at
47-55. She did highlight, however, possible advantages of the broader approach. See id.
at 52. "Finally, if the legislature were willing to define dependents broadly enough, the
enactment of family maintenance legislation could provide a needed arena for the
resolution of meritorious claims by dependents who are not related to the decedent by
blood or marriage." Id. Even proponents of the English model have suggested familial
limitations on the "other dependents" categbry. See, e.g., Note, Family Maintenance: An
Inheritance Scheme for the Living, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 673, 689 (1977) (stating that the
"'other dependents' category might have to be tailored by specification of the eligible
dependents, such as parents, other relatives supported primarily by the deceased and
'housemates' who were living with and were supported by the deceased"). The author
recognized that although "[t]here should be little resistance to the inclusion of parents and
other relatives.... [t]he inclusion of 'housemates'... may encounter resistance." Id.; see
also Christy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions
for Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941 passim (1995) (proposing a
more discretionary intestacy statute limited to financially dependent and "deserving"
family members). The author cites the English model but restricts her proposal to family
members. Id. at 947 n.37 and accompanying text.
138. Professor Fellows, for example, rejected broader family maintenance schemes that
would protect all of the decedent's dependents from disinheritance in favor of a proposal
that would benefit nuclear family members only. See Fellows, The Case Against Living
Probate, supra note 111, at 1110-11. At the same time, she has been a major proponent of
the second strategy--expanding narrow definitions of the family to "recogni[ze] ... the
changing U.S. household." Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 3
(discussing an empirical study supporting the inclusion of same-sex and opposite-sex
partners as heirs).
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ultimately offers only a partial response to the support flaws of the
inheritance system.
B. Redefining the Family
The second strategy has attempted to modernize traditional
definitions of the family to reflect the diverse composition and
circumstances of today's family. Here, reformers have targeted a
long-standing impediment to support-the narrow intestate definition
of "natural objects of the decedent's bounty" entitled to preferential
treatment under inheritance law. They have attacked the statutory
definition of the family as both underinclusive and overinclusive. As
one commentator has explained, "The definition may be
underinclusive because it excludes many currently existing family
groups.... The definition may be overinclusive because legal ties do
not necessarily create familial ties." 139
Reformers have addressed the underinclusiveness of intestacy
statutes by challenging the conventional definition of family as "a
legally married husband and wife, and the children of that
marriage. ' 140 They have attempted to update that definition to fit the
changing American family. Reformers, particularly Professor Ralph
Brashier, have paid special attention to the outdated definition of
"children."'' They have proposed substantial expansion of that
category to encompass not only marital, biological children but also
legally and equitably adopted children,'1
42 nonmarital children,' 43
139. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 41.
140. Id. at 28. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the
Family in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 389 n.8 (discussing the
privileged position of the "natural family" defined as "the traditional nuclear family-
husband/father, wife/mother, and their children").
141. For a comprehensive discussion of the failure of existing rules to encompass
children in nontraditional families and the flaws in current definitions of the parent-child
realtionship, see Brashier, Children and Inheritance, supra note 6.
142. See, e.g., Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who
Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711 passim (1984); Note, Equitable
Adoption: They Took Him into Their Home and Called Him Fred, 58 VA. L. REV. 727
passim (1972). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmts. d-k (1999) (discussing legal and equitable adoption).
143. See, e.g., Karen A. Hauser, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New
Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add up to the Need for Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
891 passim (1997); Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonmarital Children-Exploring the
1990 Uniform Probate Code's Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 539 passim (1998); James R. Robinson, Comment, Untangling the "Loose
Threads": Equitable Adoption, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal
Family Arrangements, 48 EMORY L.J. 943 passim (1999). Reformers have focused
principally on expanding the definition of "child" to allow nonmarital children to inherit
from their parents. See, e.g., Brashier, Children and Inheritance, supra note 6, at 95-147;
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stepchildren,"M  children of unmarried cohabitants, 45  children
produced by reproductive technology, 6 and nonrelated individuals in
a child-parent relationship with the decedent. 47
Commentators have also focused on the narrow definition of
"spouse." They have offered a variety of schemes to extend
inheritance rights to survivors of nonmarital as well as marital
committed relationships. A notable such scheme is Professor
Lawrence Waggoner's Working Draft of a proposed intestacy statute
that would provide inheritance rights to surviving "committed
partners."'4 A few reformers have called for an even more expansive
definition of the traditional family. Professor Mary Louise Fellows,
for example, has emphasized "family units headed by committed
partners. 149 Professor Gary Spitko has called for explicit recognition
of gay and lesbian families in inheritance statutesY. Other reformers
have gone still further. Professor John Gaubatz, for example, has
Hauser, supra, passim. In an innovative recent article, Professor Katheleen Guzman
considers the "reverse" situation--"the rights of those parents to inherit from [nonmarital]
children." Katheleen Guzman, Essay: What Price Paternity?, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 77,77-78
(2000).
144. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hanson, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren: California
Leads the Way but Has It Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257 passim (1995);
Mahoney, supra note 43, passim.
145. See, e.g., Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 65-89; Laura M.
Padilla, Flesh of My Flesh but Not My Heir: Unintended Disinheritance, 36 BRANDEIS J.
FAM. L. 219 passim (1997-98).
146. For discussions of inheritance reforms to cover such children, see, for example,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5
cmt. 1 (1999); Brashier, Children and Inheritance, supra note 6, at 177-222; Chester,
Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 6; Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body
Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193
(1997).
147. See, e.g., Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 71-80.
148. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, supra note 11, at 79 (setting out
a "Working Draft" allowing inheritance by a decedent's surviving de facto partner and
defining such partner as an individual who was "not... prohibited from marrying the
decedent... by reason of a blood relationship to the decedent" and who was at the
decedent's death "unmarried and regularly living in the same household with the decedent
in a marriage-like relationship"). In an updated version of the Working Draft, Professor
Waggoner uses the term "committed partner" rather than "de facto partner." See Fellows
et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 92-94 (reproducing an updated version of
Waggoner's Working Draft). Professor Waggoner offered his proposal as a "starting point
for discussion" that could lead to reform of elective share provisions as well. Waggoner,
Marital Property Rights in Transition, supra note 11, at 78.
149. Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 65.
150. Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law, supra note 5, at 1096 (calling
for "recognition in [Uniform Probate Code] Article II's intestacy scheme of the reality
that gay and lesbian families exist. .. ").
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argued that inheritance law should recognize that the "decedent's
close family might include nonblood relatives and friends." '
Reports of escalating violence, abuse, and neglect within the
American family have led some reformers to conclude that the
statutory definition of family is overinclusive as well as
underinclusive.152  They contend that a strict status-based scheme
effectively allows wrongdoers to inherit from their victims.1 53 In
response, these critics too have attempted to redefine the family to
exclude even the closest family members for misconduct toward the
decedent.
As I have discussed elsewhere,154 most reformers have found
their solution in the traditional notion of "unworthy heirs"-heirs
whose conduct is deemed so "reprehensible" that they are
disqualified from inheritance.15 5 Proponents have recommended
expanding the "unworthy heirs" category to penalize not only
"slayers" 156 of the decedent but also family members who abandoned,
deserted, or refused to support the decedent.157 Other reformers have
responded more broadly with what Professor Paula Monopoli has
termed a "behavior-based model of inheritance," a model that would
permit courts in cases of misconduct toward the decedent to deviate
from the status-based definition of the family and deny inheritance
151. Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 559.
152. Guzman, supra note 143, at 91 (arguing that Oklahoma intestacy statutes are
"both over- and under-inclusive [and] [c]apping the inheritance rights of all nonmarital
fathers sweeps in many deserving fathers yet bypasses many undeserving mothers"). For
sources offering proposals to respond to family violence, abuse, and neglect, see supra
note 7.
153. See Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The
Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 80 (1998) [hereinafter Foster, Behavior-
Based Model] (discussing the "claim that, under present conditions, an inflexible, status-
based model effectively permits wrongdoers to inherit from their victims").
154. Id. at 80.
155. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 462 (referring to homicide as one of the
"reprehensible acts that result in forfeiture").
156. For sources discussing statutes and case law disqualifying "slayers," see supra note
39.
157. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 153, at 80 (stating that the
unworthy heirs category' "[o]riginally limited almost exclusively to 'slayers' of the
decedent.., now increasingly extends to heirs who abandoned, deserted, or refused to
support the decedent"). For a review of legislative and judicial reforms to prevent
inheritance by spouses and children for abandonment, neglect or failure to support the
decedent, see WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 81-82 n.8; Monopoli, supra note 7, at
260 n.11, 265-76; Alison M. Stemler, Note, Parents Who Abandon or Fail to Support Their




rights to even the decedent's closest relative.18 A few legal scholars
have recognized the full implications of a behavior-based model and
have called for a redefinition of the family that would factor in
"good" behavior as well as "bad" behavior.'59
Thus far, in their efforts to modernize the conventional definition
of family, reformers have taken three basic approaches. 60 The
"formal" approach accepts the statutory definition of family as
"based on blood or formal legal registration processes""16 but expands
the opportunities for families to establish legal as well as personal
ties. 62 Proposals to extend inheritance rights to legally adopted
children or to legally registered domestic partners provide two
examples.163
158. Monopoli, supra note 7, at 297 (proposing "a behavior-based model of inheritance
by fathers from their deceased children[]" that allows courts to "deviat[e] from a status-
based model"). The behavior-based model would exclude even the family paradigm's
most preferred claimants if they engaged in misconduct toward the decedent. For
example, it would bar a "deadbeat dad" from inheriting from the child he abandoned, see
id., and would prevent an abusive child from inheriting from the parent she mistreated, see
Korpus, supra note 38, at 572-77. The most recent proponent of the behavior-based
model has noted that in the elder abuse context ninety percent of the abusers are family
members. Korpus, supra note 38, at 540. Two-thirds of the abusers are the victims' adult
children or spouses of those children. Id. at 540-41. She calls for behavior-based statutes
that would "extinguish inheritance rights," id. at 573, of abusers in the full range of elder
abuse situations: cases of "physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional or psychological abuse,
financial or material exploitation, abandonment, or neglect," id at 540 n.13.
159. See, e.g., Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 153, at 81 ("[A] narrow vision
of a behavior-based model punishes 'bad' behavior but disregards 'good' behavior. As a
result, it fails to explore the full potential of a behavior-based model to use inheritance for
'encouraging and rewarding' exemplary conduct within the family and society."); Gaubatz,
supra note 44, at 511-12, 562-63 (discussing the need to "provid[e] for the meritorious")
(capitalization omitted); Rhodes, supra note 7, passim (discussing approaches for
rewarding a "caring parent" of the decedent as well as penalizing an "abandoning parent"
of the decedent); Thornley, supra note 49, at 540-49 (proposing a "care-sensitive"
standard to promote inheritance by the claimant who was in a "caring relationship" with
the decedent).
160. The following discussion of the first two approaches-the formal approach and
the functional approach-draws heavily on Professor Gary's recent analysis. See Gary,
Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 31-67.
161. Id. at 31-32.
162. Id.
163. See id at 32-40 (setting out examples). Two states, Hawaii and Vermont, have
already adopted this approach toward same-sex domestic partners. See HAW. REv. STAT.
§§ 560:2-102, 560:2-207, 572C-4, 572C-5 (Supp. 2000) (extending inheritance rights to
unmarried adults who are legally prohibited from marrying each other and formally
register their relationship as a "reciprocal beneficiary relationship"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 1202-05 (Supp. 2000) (extending inheritance rights to nonrelated persons of the
same sex who formally enter into a "civil union").
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The "functional" approach focuses instead on the quality of the
relationship between the claimant and decedent.164 Its principal
concern is whether those individuals "act[ed] like family members."165
Proposals to exclude "unworthy heirs" are illustrative of this
approach. For example, Professor Anne-Marie Rhodes has called for
a new definition of "parent" for inheritance purposes that would
require "the act of becoming a parent (birth or adoption) coupled
with the acts of being a parent (care and nurturing of the child). ' 66
Other commentators have used a functional approach to expand the
definition of family to include new members of today's American
family. Thus, in his Working Draft, Professor Waggoner has
proposed to recognize inheritance rights of committed partners in a
"marriage-like relationship. '" 1 67 Similarly, Professor Gary has recently
offered a scheme to extend intestacy rights to nonrelated individuals
in a "parent-child relationship.'
16s
The "decedent-controlled"169  approach, in contrast, bases
inheritance rights on the decedent's own definition of her "family of
choice. 1 70  The most recent proponent of this approach, Professor
Tanya Hernindez, has argued in the wills context that courts should
recognize the expanding definition of family by allowing the
"articulated preferences of a testator 171 to prevail over status-based
definitions of family. Professor Hernndez has suggested that the
decedent-controlled approach also potentially could apply in the
intestate context.172 She has apparently ruled out, however, cases
164. Herndndez, supra note 10, at 1006 (stating that the functional approach
"legitimizes non-nuclear relationships that share the essential qualities of traditional
relationships for a given context by inquiring whether a relationship shares the main
characteristics of caring, commitment, economic cooperation and participation in domestic
responsibilities").
165. Gary, supra note 2, at 42 (describing the functional approach as "determin[ing]
whether identified persons are acting like family members").
166. Rhodes, supra note 7, at 526.
167. See supra note 148.
168. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 81-82 app. (setting out proposed
legislation).
169. Hernindez, supra note 10, at 1017 (referring to "decedent-controlled definitions
of family").
170. Id. at 1028 (concluding that mortal remains legislation provides a model for the
law of wills by "respecting the individual's autonomy to define for himself or herself who
constitutes family beyond biological constraints. In this way both the needs of the
individual and the family of choice are validated.").
171. Id at 973.
172. Id. at 1016-17. Professor Hernndez stops short of endorsing this approach,
however, due to concerns regarding "predictability and judicial economy." Id at 1016.
She is troubled by the fact that such concerns are "being valued at the expense of
undermining the stability of a testator's family of choice in contravention of the role of
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where "no record of a [decedent's] individual preferences" exists.173
At least one scholar has taken a step toward using a decedent-
controlled approach in that situation as well. Professor Gaubatz has
argued that courts should have some flexibility to adjust intestate
shares to reflect "the reasonable expectations or probable desires of
the decedent." 174 He has concluded that even "[a]ssuming that there
is no evidence of the actual desire of the decedent, such desire could
nonetheless be approximated."' 75
The formal, functional, and decedent-controlled approaches all
respond to the support flaws in American inheritance law. By
redefining the category of preferred family claimants, these reform
proposals promise to extend inheritance rights and protections to
dependents and caregivers who receive little recognition under
existing rules-adoptive, nonmarital, blended, and extended family
members, unmarried opposite-sex and same-sex partners, and other
nonrelated individuals in "families by choice or need. ' 176  Yet,
ultimately all three approaches are inadequate because they share a
common limitation. They continue to use "family" as their point of
reference.
The formal approach essentially attempts to "bring 'new' families
into the fold"'77 by squeezing them into the existing definition of the
natural family. 7 This "retrofitting of inheritance laws" '179 thus covers
only individuals in relationships that can be accommodated within
traditional family categories. 8 ' The functional approach too is
inheritance to make 'succession more meaningful, valuable and responsive to the needs
and circumstances of a particular family.' " Id. at 1016-17 (quoting Halbach, supra note
32, at 4). She ultimately concludes that "[t]he role of the family of choice in the intestate
context merits greater study." Id. at 1017.
173. Id.
174. Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 559-60.
175. Id. at 560.
176. Padilla, supra note 145, at 221 n.8 (adopting the phrase from Elvia R. Arriola,
Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 J. FAM. L. 691 passim (1996-97)).
177. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 31.
178. Id at 160 (arguing that the formal approach used in California's statute on
stepchildren "does not attempt to incorporate new family structures, but rather seeks to
squeeze the new family structures into existing rules").
179. Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 15.
180. The formal approach may also encourage such individuals to "conform[] to
traditional family norms." Id. Considerable debate exists, especially among feminist and
gay and lesbian scholars, over the desirability of that result. See id. at 9-10, 27 (explaining
that an intestacy statute that bases inheritance on "marriage-like" relationships "[flor
some opposite-sex couples .... risk[s] assimilation into a marriage model that the partners
might have chosen to reject because of its patriarchal roots" and "may be politically
unappealing to LGBT [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual] communities [who] ...
might reason that it increases the potential of reinforcing heterosexual norms"). For an
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
undermined by its family perspective. Indeed, even its proponents
have acknowledged that this approach may prove harmful to the
nontraditional families it is supposed to promote. As Professor Gary
has recognized, "If the functional definition of family is based on the
way a nuclear family functions, then many non-traditional families
may still be left out of the definition." '181
The decedent-controlled approach also provides uncertain
protection because of its family focus. By restricting its scope to "any
person that a [decedent] may have preferred and viewed as family,"
1 2
this approach invites an initial definitional question: Did the
decedent regard the claimant in the capacity of family member?s 3
Once again, the nuclear family may serve as the benchmark at the
expense of a decedent's nonconforming "family of choice."
As for individuals outside the decedent's "family," all three
approaches disregard their claims. The formal, functional, and
decedent-controlled approaches follow the conventional practice of
defining "natural objects of the decedent's bounty" in familial terms.
As a result, even their expanded definitions of the family exclude
dependents and caregivers whom a particular decedent may have
considered her "natural objects" but not family members. In the end,
then, reformers' efforts to redefine the family also fail to offer a
comprehensive response to the support flaws of American inheritance
extended discussion of the debate within the lesbian and gay community over the
desirability of legalized same-sex marriage, see David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95
MICH. L. REV. 447, 449-52, 486-91 (1996); Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay
Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 63 passim (1991). Another flaw of the formal approach is that it fails to
address the "unworthy heir" problem and continues to adopt a status-based approach to
determining inheritance rights. See Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 41.
181. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 142; see also Note, Looking for a
Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of
Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1653 (1991) (criticizing functionalism for requiring "that
all alternative families resemble traditionally recognized relationships in function, if not
precise form").
182. Herngndez, supra note 10, at 1018 n.259 (emphasis added).
183. In a world where "[tihere is even confusion about how to define 'mother' under
the law," Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from
Welfare 'Reform,' Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 689 (1998), a
scheme that requires an initial definition of "family" status or behavior is problematic. As
Professor Fineman has noted,
[I]t is no longer clear what constitutes appropriate family role behavior-who is
or has acted as a "good" wife and mother, or husband and father, fulfilling the
well-defined roles in the nuclear family. In fact, it is no longer clear these are
even appropriate questions for the legal system to ask.
Fineman, supra note 140, at 396.
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law because this strategy too remains anchored in a family
framework.
C. Procedural Mechanisms to Mitigate the Effects of the Family
Paradigm on Nonconforming Wills
The third strategy also has addressed the preference for family
members in the law of inheritance but from a different direction. It
has offered procedural mechanisms to protect so-called
"nonconforming wills," 184 wills that deviate from traditional family
norms. Proponents of this strategy have attacked the rules and
presumptions that courts use to undermine such wills, focusing
particularly on the dangers of existing mental capacity doctrines.
Reformers argue that these doctrines are so nebulous that they
effectively allow judges and juries to overturn wills that leave
property to persons who are not "natural objects of the decedent's
bounty"-that is, not close family members.1 5
Several of these critics have challenged the conventional
presumptions used in mental capacity cases. 18 6 In particular, they
have called for changes in presumptions with respect to caring
relationships to recognize the reality of American society today.
Professor Ray Madoff, for example, has identified two such
presumptions: "(1) family relationships are co-extensive with caring
relationships" and hence "naturally" recognized by gratuitous
bequest"8 and "(2) confidential relationships are market relationships
governed by an ethic of selfish individualism""m and hence
"naturally" recognized by contract rather than gratuitous bequest. 9
184. Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 281 (referring to a
"nonconforming will").
185. E. Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1065, 1075 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Judge Not] (arguing that the "doctrines of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, and testamentary fraud are sufficiently nebulous
that they give wide berth to a trier of fact" to impose "majoritarian cultural norms on the
decedent who has left an estate plan that deviates from the cultural norm favoring
dispositions to the legal spouse and close blood relations over dispositions to 'non-
family' "). For a sampling of other sources expressing similar views, see supra note 55.
186. For an extended discussion and analysis of burdens of proof and presumptions in
mental capacity and undue influence cases, see Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention,
supra note 89, at 29-46.
187. Madoff, supra note 9, at 608.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 609-10. Professor Madoff draws her "market/family dichotomy" from
Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498, 1520-21 (1983). Madoff, supra note 9, at 606-07.
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Reformers have proposed either abandoning1 9 or reversing such
presumptions to reward rather than penalize acts of care.191
Other scholars have concluded that even more drastic procedural
reforms are required to ensure a fair hearing for nonconforming wills.
For some commentators, ante-mortem probate offers a potential
solution. 19 Under this approach, a court could determine the validity
of a will during the testator's lifetime based on "the best evidence of
the testator's capacity to execute a will, namely, the testator
herself."193 The testator could personally explain to the fact-finder
the reasons for her "unnatural" will and rebut mental capacity
challenges. 94 Professor Lloyd Bonfield has proposed a different ante-
mortem mechanism to protect wills from undue influence
challenges-adoption of the continental European notarial system for
authentication of wills.195
190. See Kurt Wanless, Comment, Rethinking Oregon's Law of Undue Influence in Will
Contests, 76 OR. L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1997) ("advocating that Oregon temper its law of
undue influence by removing the presumption and imposing [a] fact-intensive inquiry in its
place"); see also Madoff, supra note 9, at 629 (arguing that these presumptions "must be
abandoned" if undue influence doctrine is to promote freedom of testation rather than
family protection). Professor Madoff stops short of advocating this position, however.
She defines her work as "beg[inning the] inquiry" into "whether family protection can be
justified." Id.
191. Thornley, supra note 49, at 542 (calling for a change in presumption to "encourage
acts of care-not punish them").
192. Proponents of "ante-mortem probate" or "living probate" reforms have offered
differing models. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative
Models of Ante-Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession,
78 MICH. L. REV. 89, 111-21 (1979) (describing the "administrative model"); Howard
Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After Death?, 37 OHIO ST.
L.J. 264, 274-87, 289-90 (1976) (describing the "contest model"); John H. Langbein,
Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75-85 (1978)
[hereinafter Langbein, Living Probate] (describing the "conservatorship model"). For a
summary, comparison, and critique of these approaches, see Fellows, The Case Against
Living Probate, supra note 111, at 1067-1109; Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra
note 14, at 290-94.
193. Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 290.
194. According to Professor Spitko:
[A]nte-mortem probate affords the testator the opportunity to explain in person
to the fact-finder why she devised her estate as she did and to refute personally
any claims that her "unnatural" disposition of her property was the product of
fraud, undue influence or a deficient mental capacity at the time she executed her
will.
Id.
195. Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some
Guidance from the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1918-20 (1996) (proposing adoption of the
notarial system to "immunizel" wills from undue influence challenges by "disgruntled
heirs"). The civil law notarial system permits a testator to execute a so-called
"authenticated will" before a notary, "a legally qualified and experienced officer of the
state who is obliged to satisfy himself of the testator's capacity as a precondition for
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Reformers have emphasized the particular threat that juries pose
to nonconforming wills.'t9 They argue that in mental capacity cases,
juries "are 'more disposed to work equity for the disinherited' than to
follow the law"'197 or the testator's wishes. One commentator has
responded to this problem'9 of jury bias with a proposal to change
evidentiary rules in will contests to deny juries the opportunity to
view the dispositive provisions of the will at issue.'99 Other reformers
have gone even further and suggested abolishing jury trials altogether
in will contests involving mental capacity or undue influence.2 °
Most recently, commentators have attacked the traditional
adjudication2°' process itself. These reformers argue that in will
receiving or transcribing the testament." Langbein, Living Probate, supra note 192, at 65.
The authenticated will, although expensive, provides "evidence of exceptional quality"
regarding the testator's capacity and is "extremely difficult for contestants to set aside."
Id. at 65-66.
196. Critics of jury involvement in will contests draw heavily on empirical studies. See
Edward S. Bade, Jury Trial in Will Cases in Minnesota, 22 MINN. L. REv. 513 passim
(1938) (comparing the outcomes of Minnesota bench and jury trials involving issues of
testamentary capacity and undue influence in will execution); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will
Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607 (1987) (analyzing will
contest outcomes tried by judges and juries in Nashville, Tennessee); Note, Will Contests
on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REv. 91 (1953) (criticizing jury involvement in will contest trials in
California).
197. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 63, at 583 (quoting Langbein, Living Probate,
supra note 192, at 65).
198. Not all legal scholars view jury preference for will contestants as a problem. For
example, Professor Chester has recently highlighted the "marked propensity [of probate
judges] to find for will proponents" and has argued that jury trials" 'level the playing field'
between proponent and contestant." Ronald Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?: Jury
Trials and Mediation as Means of Resolving Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REv. 173, 204
(1999) [hereinafter Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?]. He contends that juries may do
a better job than judges on the "case-by-case factual analysis" required under "vague"
mental capacity doctrines "because juries appear to focus on what seems most important:
who among competing legatees gets what and whether this distribution is just." Id.
Although he concludes that mediation is the "best system of resolving will contests,"
Professor Chester argues that "[t]he second-best method would be to have a jury impart
the community's sense of what a typical family might feel is fair." Id at 205.
199. See Michael Falker, Comment, A Case Against Admitting into Evidence the
Dispositive Elements of a Will in a Contest Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 616,629-30 (1970).
200. See, e.g., Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will
Contests, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 530-31 (arguing that "states should have a bright-
line rule forbidding jury trials in will contests").
201. Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 314 (arguing that
"[t]raditional adjudication may disadvantage cultural minorities even when they seek to
vindicate legal rights arising under neutral law"); see Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to
the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in Probate, Trust, and
Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 603 (2000) ("Frequently
[probate, trust, and guardianship] disputes lead to litigation that results in substantial
tangible costs to the estate, trust, or guardianship assets, as well as intangible costs to the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
contests involving nonconforming wills, alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) techniques better serve the interests of testator and survivors.
Professor Spitko, for example, has concluded that fact-finders, judges
and juries alike,2°2 are so often biased against wills that depart from
majoritarian family norms that the abhorrent testator should have the
right to opt out of the legal forum. 23 He has proposed a scheme of
"testator-compelled arbitration," under which a testator could direct
in her will that any future will contest be adjudicated by an arbitrator
selected by her.2°
Other ADR advocates have focused instead on the needs of the
testator's survivors. They regard mediation as the best approach for
addressing the full range of issues-both emotional and legal-
presented by nonconforming wills.205 These reformers argue that,
unlike litigation, mediation responds to the root cause of many
mental capacity challenges: "competing notions of fairness1 '2°6 among
the decedent's survivors. They contend that fairness concerns arise
particularly often in cases where a testator departed from "natural"
will distribution patterns to recognize special services provided by
one family member or relationships outside traditional family
boundaries.2 7 Commentators point to numerous other advantages of
families involved."). Parties will often settle rather than litigate will contests. See Gary,
Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 424 n.155 (citing statistics on settlement of
probate disputes). For a critique of "party-driven settlement," see Chester, Less Law, but
More Justice?, supra note 198, at 181-82.
202. Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 287 (rejecting jury reform
proposals as inadequate because judges also are "likely not to appreciate or respect the
values and beliefs of the 'abhorrent' testator [and because j]udges elected by the greater
community as well as judges appointed and confirmed by officials who are themselves
elected by that community are likely to share the values and biases of the community").
203. Id. at 314 (arguing that the trier of fact may use mental capacity doctrines "to
redistribute the 'abhorrent' testator's probate estate to a legal spouse or close blood
relations in line with the trier of fact's majoritarian values and choices" and proposing
"[a]rbitration... [as] a means for cultural minorities to opt out of a legal forum that is
often biased against them").
204. Id. at 276-77 ("recommend[ing] that the nonconforming testator direct in her will
that any contest concerning the will shall be adjudicated by an arbitrator appointed by the
testator").
205. See, e.g., Dominic J. Campisi, Using ADR in Property and Probate Disputes,
PROB. & PROP., May/June 1995, at 48, 52 (discussing advantages of mediation for dealing
with emotional issues); Gary, Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 425-28
(discussing the "emotional costs of litigation" and stating that "[m]ediation recognizes that
many disputes involve emotional as well as legal issues").
206. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 418; see Radford, supra note
201, at 641 ("The flexibility of mediation also allows the parties to construct a resolution
they perceive as fair, which may prove more satisfying than a formal, legal resolution.").
207. See Gary, Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 417-19 & nn.122-30; see
also Susan N. Gary, Mediating Probate Disputes, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 1999, at 11,
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mediation over litigation for resolving disputes involving
nonconforming wills. Specifically, they emphasize that mediation
reduces financial and administrative costs,0 8 enhances privacy and
confidentiality, 20 9  offers techniques to repair and preserve
relationships among contending parties,210 and "empowers" parties
who view themselves as "marginalized in the judicial process '211 to
fashion their own unique solution to their dispute based on nonlegal
as well as legal factors.
Proponents of this third reform strategy have contributed
important insights into the dangers of the family paradigm. They
have presented a devastating picture of a legal process in which
decisionmakers impose their own abstract vision of appropriate
family wealth distribution at the expense of individual intent, needs,
and circumstances. Critics have shown that this approach is
particularly prejudicial to caring relationships, which increasingly fall
outside conventional definitions of the family. Some reformers have
even begun the search for new "custom-made" approaches based on
the actual needs of testators and survivors rather than "a hostile or
dysfunctional rule of general application.
213
14-15 (discussing a scenario in which a testator's will leaves the entire estate to the
daughter who cared for the testator for many years rather than dividing the estate equally
between the testator's two daughters).
208. See, e.g., Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?, supra note 198, at 198; Gary,
Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 431; Radford, supra note 201, at 642-43.
209. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 424 (stating that mediation
promotes "privacy and confidentiality"); see also Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?,
supra note 198, at 198 ("Mediation takes into consideration the fact that most families do
not want to 'air their dirty laundry' in open court."). Privacy may be particularly desirable
"[i]f the dispute involves relationships outside of society's accepted norms." Gary,
Mediating Probate Disputes, supra note 207, at 14.
210. See Gary, Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 428 ("Mediation can repair,
maintain, or improve ongoing relationships."). Professor Gary stresses that mediation
"increases communication between [the] parties" and also teaches parties techniques for
resolving future conflicts. Id.
211. Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?, supra note 198, at 198 (summarizing
findings of a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Report on Dispute Resolution).
212. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly, supra note 14, at 429. "Mediation allows parties
to craft their own solution to a dispute. The solution may involve money damages or the
distribution of property according to legal standards, but it may also take into
consideration the nonlegal interests of the parties." Id. Professor Gary recognizes that
despite the advantages of mediation, "some characteristics of probate disputes may make
mediation difficult or even inappropriate." Gary, Mediating Probate Disputes, supra note
207, at 13. She emphasizes four such characteristics: "grief," "power imbalance," "long-
term dispute," and "need for precedent." Id.; see also Radford, supra note 201, at 638-40
(discussing "control and power imbalances" in mediation).
213. Spitko, Judge Not, supra note 185, at 1083.
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Ultimately, however, this third reform strategy also fails to offer
a comprehensive response to the support flaws of the American
inheritance system. Rather than confronting the family paradigm
itself, proponents address only one context in which that paradigm
disserves support--its adverse impact on nonconforming wills. They
offer procedural reforms that either mitigate the paradigm's effects or
give parties a right of exit. In the end, however, these reformers too
leave the family paradigm in place.
III. RECONSIDERING THE FAMILY PARADIGM
Preservation of the family paradigm comes at a price. As Part
III.A will show, it imposes significant human costs. In the changing
American society of the twenty-first century, these human costs have
escalated to the point that the family paradigm has lost its mandate.
The paradigm has become at best outdated and at worst oppressive.
Part III.B looks beyond the family paradigm to consider possible new
directions for inheritance law. As Professor Bruce Mann has argued,
"[w]hen the categories of the past can no longer accommodate the
present, they must eventually change or be abandoned." '14
A. The Human Costs of the Family Paradigm
1. Beneficiaries: Hardships and Windfalls
The family paradigm prizes status above need, desert, or
affection. It presumes that family members-particularly "close"
family members-are most entitled to inherit regardless of their
actual relationship with the decedent. Under this mechanical
approach, the wrong people can and do inherit. The family paradigm
allows a daughter to inherit even though she ignored her father's
existence for twenty-five years and refused to care for him during his
final bout with cancer; it rejects as undue influence the caring acts of
neighbors who fed, sheltered, nursed, bathed, and comforted the
frightened and helpless old man.2 15 The family paradigm permits a
father who physically, emotionally, and sexually abused his daughter
to inherit as the "natural" recipient of his daughter's estate.1 6 The
family paradigm prefers so-called "laughing heirs," relatives so
214. Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46, at 1062.
215. See Mitchell v. Smith, 779 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). In fairness, the
daughter was willing to support her father but only "if he would buy her a double-wide
house trailer to live in." Id.
216. Crosby v. Corley, 528 So. 2d 1141, 1142-43 (Ala. 1988).
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distant that they "laugh all the way to the bank rather than grieve 217
for the decedent, over the most beloved or needy friend or
companion.2 s
This is not to say that the family paradigm never matches reality.
Even in this day of eroding families, there remain spouses, children,
parents, and siblings whose "affection-support '219 relationship with
217. GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 31 (1999). The battle over Howard Hughes' estate may be the most
famous example of inheritance by laughing heirs. It even inspired a critically-acclaimed
film. MELVIN AND HOWARD (Universal 1980). Hughes, an eccentric recluse, died in
1976, with no immediate family, an unsigned will, and an estate of over $500 million.
Nearly 500 people claimed the estate "often equipped with fake wills and outrageous
claims." ROGER W. ANDERSEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 36
(1996). In 1981, a Houston jury awarded the estate to 21 cousins and an aunt, "far-flung
relations, many of whom were complete strangers to him." Id. For another notable
laughing heirs case, see In re Garrett's Estate, 94 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1953) (per curiam). After
22 years, 2000 hearings, 1100 witnesses, and a record of 390 volumes (totalling 115,000
pages), a Philadelphia Orphan's Court finally resolved the claims of 26,000 potential heirs
to Henrietta Garrett's $17,000,000 estate. Id at 358-59. Even after this lengthy period,
26,000 disappointed claimants... still sincerely believe[d] that they [were]
entitled to her estate as next of kin and [could] not understand how any Court
[could] fail to recognize their close relationship to their dear and treasured
Henrietta whom they never saw or knew but of whom they [had] recently
become so fond.
Id. at 359. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed their claims stating that "unlike
Tennyson's brook, the Garrett estate cannot go on forever." Id. at 359, 362-63. In
response to such laughing heirs cases, several jurisdictions have enacted intestacy laws
barring inheritance by remote collaterals. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-4 (West 1983
& Supp. 2001) (limiting inheritance to collateral relatives who are the decedent's
parent(s), issue of parent(s), grandparent(s), or issue of grandparent(s)).
218. See, e.g., In re Estate of Biewald, 468 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(awarding the intestate estate to the decedent's first cousins and first cousins once
removed rather than her cohabitant of more than fifty years); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994
P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the claim of the decedent's dependent
same-sex life-partner of nearly thirty years to a share of the decedent's intestate estate).
Rules that permit inheritance by laughing heirs may come at the expense of nuclear family
members as well. For example, in a recent case, a California widow ended up sharing her
husband's modest intestate estate with an heir finder. Estate of Griswold v. See, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). After the decedent's death, the heir finder (or, as he
preferred, "forensic genealogist," id. at 639) located in Ohio two half-siblings of the
decedent and obtained from them an assignment of partial interest in the decedent's
estate. Id. The half-siblings (children of the decedent's natural father) had never met the
decedent, communicated with him, or even been aware of his existence. Id. at 639-40.
Nonetheless, the court ruled that they qualified as intestate heirs, id. at 642, thus cutting
the widow's share in half. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c)(1), 6401(c)(2)(B) (West 1991
& Supp. 2001) (awarding a surviving spouse the entire intestate estate if no surviving issue,
parent, sibling, or issue of a deceased sibling but only one-half of the intestate estate if the
decedent is survived by a parent or a parent's issue).
219. Lomenzo, supra note 137, at 960 (defining relatives "within the decedent's
'affection-support' circle [as] ... persons whom the decedent knew and had an interest in
or who depended on or had the affection of the decedent").
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the decedent is as close as their family status. Yet, as American
society changes, the family paradigm increasingly excludes the very
people who should inherit-those whose lives were most intimately
intertwined with the decedent's. This loss of inheritance can take a
heavy financial and psychological toll" ° on the decedent's survivors.
Human lives have structure. People assess their financial
resources and arrange many details of their lives accordingly. Not
only do they adjust to what they can afford to eat and where they can
afford to live, they develop self-images based on those resources.
They cannot always predict the future, but they do what they can-
saving money for their retirement or the education of their loved
ones, or spending it to deal with a crisis of their own or of someone
close to them.
Death upsets these delicate and often precarious patterns of
support. It may cut off all or part of the income of those who were
dependent on the decedent for support. It may extinguish the
consent required for them to continue living where they live, working
where they work, and using the property they use-whether it be a
television set or an automobile. It may deprive them of
companionship and support crucial to their well-being.221
Inheritance can in part offset these losses and promote greater
continuity in the decedent's survivors' lives. Inheritance can provide
the financial resources essential for maintaining livelihood and peace
of mind. When inheritance relieves hardships such as these, the same
220. Madoff, supra note 9, at 623 ("Loss of inheritance is upsetting for financial
reasons, but even more so for its psychological toll."). Although Professor Madoff refers
here to the "plight" of disinherited children, her statement applies more broadly as well to
other survivors of the decedent who are excluded from inheritance.
221. The highly publicized Vasquez case, 994 P.2d at 240, provides a prime illustration.
Frank Vasquez, age sixty-seven, shared a three-room home and a burlap-bag recycling
business with Robert Schwerzler until Schwerzler died at the age of seventy-eight in 1995.
Marsha King, Should Companion Get Deceased's Estate?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001,
at Al. Due to a childhood head injury, Vasquez can neither read nor write, id., and has
never learned how to drive. Daniel B. Kennedy, Til Death Do Us Part: Same-Sex
Survivor Seeks Assets of Partner Under Equitable Doctrine Governing Heterosexuals, 87
A.B.A.J. 22, 22 (2001). According to his lawyer, Vasquez's "name isn't on anything
because he trusted Bob to handle everything.... When Schwerzler died, Frank was utterly
adrift." Id. (citing Terry Barnett). The Washington Supreme Court is currently reviewing
the case. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 11 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2000) (granting petition for review).
In the interim, Vasquez is permitted to reside in the house he once shared with
Schwerzler. King, supra. For a critical analysis of Vasquez v. Hawthorne, see Amanda J.
Beane, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.- Vasquez v. Hawthorne Wrongly Denied




amount of money confers greater value than when received as
windfalls by laughing heirs.
Inheritance can also fulfill expectations of those who constituted
the decedent's principal source of physical, financial, or emotional
support.'m  But inheritance can do still more. It can ensure a
continued connection with a deceased loved one. The property that
survives a death is often a repository of memories, a tangible
reminder of a life shared. When this property goes instead to a family
member who had little or no actual relationship with the decedent,
the loss can be wrenching.22
2. Decedents: Loss of Control Over Property
During life, a person has virtually complete control over her
property. She can give it to whomever she pleases. She can assist the
needy, reward the meritorious, or simply indulge a whim. So long as
the property owner remains competent, that control continues until
death.
At death, the family paradigm takes over. If the decedent left no
will, the paradigm governs distribution, even if it is clear that
distribution is not what the decedent wanted or intended. 24 If the
222. See Madoff, supra note 9, at 623-24 (criticizing the argument that "a will leaving
everything to her 'helpful' neighbor on whom [the testator] has become dependent"
should be "invalidat[ed] ... based solely on the legitimate expectations of the children" on
grounds that "arguably the neighbor as well as the children expect to inherit"). This
expectations issue would arise in particular in the case of a contract to devise where the
caregiver provided services in expectation of receiving compensation in the decedent's
will. See supra Part I.C.
223. For a recent cinematic portrayal of this phenomenon, see IF THESE WALLS
COULD TALK-#2 (HBO Films 2000). See also Brian C. Hewitt, Probate Mediation: A
Means to an End, RES GESTAE, Aug. 1996, at 41, 43 ("Significant attachment to isolated
items of personal property often represents the genesis of probate disputes."); Adam J.
Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33, 56-59
(1999) (discussing the importance of heirlooms and other sorts of "personal" property in
the estate planning process).
224. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Satrustegui, 870 P.2d 1188, 1195, 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993),
corrected by 166 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). In 1986, Frank Satrustegui and
Nona Satrustegui, unmarried cohabitants who for fourteen years had lived together,
operated a bar, pooled their income, jointly owned bank accounts, a condominium, and a
safety deposit box, and even filed joint tax returns as husband and wife, filled out mail-
order form wills leaving their property to each other. Id. at 1191. They took the forms to
a bank, signed the forms in the presence of each other and a bank employee, and had their
signatures notarized. Id. Despite this clear evidence of intent, Frank's estate ultimately
passed by intestacy to his sister. Id. at 1198. The Court ruled against Nona on every
count. Id. It declared the 1986 document an invalid will and inadequate written evidence
of a contract to devise. Id. at 1193-96. The court also rejected Nona's claims to the estate
either under intestacy as a common law spouse or under a partnership agreement between
unmarried cohabitants. Id. at 1196-98.
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decedent left a will, the family paradigm still provides numerous
bases to attack it.2
The power of that paradigm is so great that it presents a
challenge even to the clearly competent testator advised by the best
lawyers. That challenge is often accompanied by inordinate expense
as the will is revised over and over-not to provide for different
beneficiaries, but merely to acknowledge changes in family status or
assets that, if not mentioned, could provide the basis for an attack.226
For the vulnerable testator, whose competency is open to attack by
reason of age or infirmity, or who does not have the best legal advice,
the family paradigm can be virtually a confiscator of property. 7
This barrier at the end of life also prevents many decedents from
managing their affairs during life in the most convenient and efficient
manner-retaining their property to the end of their lives and then
passing it to their intended beneficiaries by will. Fearing loss to the
paradigm in the end game, they are forced to give their property to
their intended beneficiaries prematurely, while they are still around
to defend their choice.2H That has its own obvious risks. 9
225. Here, too, the family paradigm may benefit the very people the testator expressly
excluded from his estate. See Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 9, at
283-89 (discussing cases in which courts "[m]anipulat[ed] the [p]rocess of [d]etermining
[i]ntent" to allow expressly disinherited family members to inherit).
226. For an extended discussion of such estate planning costs and techniques, see
Emily Berendt & Laura Lynn Michaels, Your HIV Positive Client: Easing the Burden on
the Family Through Estate Planning, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 509 passim (1991);
Matthew R. Dubois, Note, Legal Planning for Gay, Lesbian, and Non-Traditional Elders,
63 ALB. L. REv. 263,313-32 (1999).
227. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that only the wealthy may have the
luxury to provide for a beneficiary society regards as "unnatural." Hernindez, supra note
10, at 988 ("[O]ne commentator asserts that only the wealthy have expansive testamentary
freedom because their resources are extensive enough to fulfill societal expectations of
support to biological family members and simultaneously include bequests to others.")
(referring to SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 6). Another commentator has stated that:
Freedom of testation, then, is most truly a working reality for the upper classes,
but even for them it is hedged about with restrictions. The lower down the
economic scale one goes, the higher the likelihood that assets will largely be
bound assets outside the system of testation or subject to levy by the nuclear
family.
Friedman, supra note 47, at 377.
228. Even this technique may not be sufficient to avoid the family paradigm. For
example, lifetime transfers to third parties may be subject to a surviving spouse's elective
share. For a summary of judicial and legislative approaches to this issue, see
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 500-17. See also supra Part I.D (discussing
the application of the family paradigm to will substitutes).
229. For example, the relationship between donor and donee might change over time.
Years after the gift, the donor might no longer regard the donee as her beloved
companion and intended beneficiary. Or the donor's financial situation might deteriorate
after the gift. Unlike wills, valid, outright inter vivos gifts generally are irrevocable. CAL.
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3. Outsiders: Cultural Bias and Exclusion
The family paradigm "transmits a culture through property"230
that is alien to many Americans. It declares "unnatural" the very
relationships that many people, but most frequently ethnic and
cultural minorities often experience as "natural"" 1-caring
relationships with extended family members, nonmarital partners,
close friends, and nonrelated caregivers.
"Extended care systems, '232 support networks beyond the
immediate family circle, have long been a fundamental feature of
African-American, Asian-American, Latino, and Native-American
culture.y 3 They remain so today. In the past decade alone, ethnic
CIV. CODE § 1148 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001) ("A gift, other than a gift in view of
impending death, cannot be revoked by the giver."); BEYER, supra note 217, at 262
("Outright inter vivos gifts are irrevocable."). Thus, the impoverished donor must "rely
on the good will of the donee, relatives, friends, and charitable organizations or may even
need to resort to federal, state, or local welfare programs for assistance." BEYER, supra
note 217, at 262. For an extended discussion of narrow exceptions to irrevocability of gifts,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2
cmt. zz (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 63, at 223-24.
Other possible risks of inter vivos gifts include loss of control over the use of the property
and the donee's behavior; family disharmony caused by unequal gifts to family members
or gifts to nonrelatives; and reduced leverage to inspire would-be donees to treat the
property owner with "deference and respect." BEYER, supra note 217, at 262 (discussing
the disadvantages of outright inter vivos gifts, including "[l]ack of [c]ontrol," "[j]ealousy,"
and "[lieverage [r]eduction"). Other lifetime efforts to avoid the family paradigm at death
present risks as well. See Dubois, supra note 226, at 317-19, 323 (discussing the risks for
gay, lesbian, and non-traditional elders of joint property ownership with right of
survivorship, including tax issues, privacy concerns, and challenges by biological family
members).
230. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 11 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
application of Anglo-American tradition to American Indian law and stating that
"inheritance [can be] viewed not only as a transmission of property, but also of culture
through property").
231. These relationships may not only be "natural" but also essential to a healthy life.
Hernindez, supra note 10, at 1006 n.188 ("[M]edical studies demonstrate that individuals
with diverse social networks beyond biological family ties have an increased resistance to
disease.").
232. Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Families: Building
on Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 52-53 (1998) (referring
to and discussing "extended care systems").
233. See, e.g., id. at 51-56 (discussing extended care systems in African-American,
Asian-American, Latino, and Native-American cultures and communities); Elvia R.
Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691, 696-
97 (1996-97) (discussing "cultural values of care and support" in Latino and Native-
American culture); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black
Community: A Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1658-
67 (1995) (discussing the African-American extended family social system, which includes
"caring for the elderly as well as the physical, emotional, educational, financial, and child-
rearing support of children, through the cooperative efforts of the adults in the community
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minority communities have witnessed an extraordinary increase3 in
so-called "kinship caregiving" to the point that hundreds of
thousands of American children are now raised by extended family
members and nonrelatives rather than their "legal" parentsY
6
Similarly, for many African-American, Mexican-American, and
Native-American communities, nonmarital cohabitation is both a
cultural tradition and common practice. 37 The family paradigm
disregards these ethnic differences.138 It places family status above
any "cultural values of care and support."' 2 9
and the family"); see also Davis v. Means, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6125 (Navajo 1994), in DAVID
H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 408, 411 (4th
ed. 1998) (emphasizing the importance of extended family and stating that "Navajo
common law on the family extends beyond the nuclear family to the child's grandparents,
uncles, aunts, cousins and the clan relationships. This is inherent in the Navajo doctrine of
ak'ei (kinship).").
234. Randi S. Mandelbaum & Susan L. Waysdorf, The D.C. Medical Consent Law:
Moving Towards Legal Recognition of Kinship Caring, 2 D.C. L. REV. 279, 284 (1994)
("While kinship caregiving has a rich and varied history in the United States, it has
experienced a phenomenal growth in the last decade.").
235. Despite its name, "kinship caregiving" refers to care provided by nonrelatives
("fictive kin," see Holmes, supra note 233, at 1659 n.37) as well as extended family
members. See Susan L. Waysdorf, Families in the AIDS Crisis: Access, Equality,
Empowerment, and the Role of Kinship Caregivers, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 145, 151
n.10 (1994) (defining "kinship care" as that "provided by a relative or by any adult person
with close personal or familial ties to the biological parent(s)"). For a discussion of
definitions, see Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square Pegs Into Round Holes: The
Need for a New Funding Scheme for Kinship Caregivers, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907,910-
11 n.4 (1995).
236. See Mandelbaum & Waysdorf, supra note 234, at 285 (stating that "kinship
caregiving has been the hidden safety net providing for the continued stability, sustenance,
and survival of hundreds of thousands of children nationwide"). Kinship caregiving is
particularly common in "African-American, Native[-IAmerican, and Hispanic
communities." Id. at 285 n.27.
237. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 725-31, 767 (1996) (discussing "informal marriage" in the
African-American, Mexican-American, and Native-American cultural traditions and
current practice); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Informal Marriage and Common Law Marriage, in
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 297, 323-24 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965) (stating that
informal cohabitation arises frequently among ethnic minority groups, especially African-
Americans, Indians, and Eskimos).
238. This is by no means unique to the inheritance system. For example, Professor
Weyrauch has emphasized the "ethnocentric approach toward marriage." Weyrauch,
supra note 237, at 325. He points to the "belief that there is only one kind of marriage, the
one which is 'right' and 'proper.' " Id. at 326. He explains that the "increasing pressure to
abolish common law marriage" reflects the view that "[i]t is a foreign substance within an
ethnocentric legal order, which primarily protects middle-class values." I. For a
discussion stating that the "nonrecognition of common law marriage has a substantially
disparate impact upon persons of different races and cultures," see Bowman, supra note
237, at 767.
239. Arriola, supra note 233, at 696 (referring to Latino culture). Note that even in its
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The family paradigm is not only ethnically biased, however. It
also excludes cultural minorities-that is, individuals whose lifestyles,
values, or beliefs diverge from those of the majority 40 In particular,
the family paradigm excludes individuals who are unable or unwilling
to enter into formal "legal" family relationships. It denies inheritance
rights to same-sex partners based on their sexual orientation alone.
The family paradigm, even in its most expansive version, also fails to
accommodate those who reject "family" classification on ideological
or personal grounds.24' It requires such individuals to accept a family
label they find repugnant in order to devise or inherit.
definition of family, the family paradigm is culturally biased. A definition of family that
favors the "small, nuclear unit" ignores the fact that "the concept of the family is culturally
determined and subject to ethnic and cultural variations." Walter 0. Weyrauch, Remarks,
in GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: EXPOSITION AND PRACTICE 154, 154 (David A. Funk ed.,
1988); see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the
Family, 79 NEB. L. REv. 577, 607-56 (2000) (discussing the contrasting cultural definitions
of family in American Indian tribal jurisprudence and Anglo-American jurisprudence).
For example, Professor Atwood emphasizes the impact of "family" definition on child
custody disputes between parents and grandparents. She states:
In many such cases, the tribal court portrays the grandparent as a cultural
insider-the special elder who can... imbue the child with a sense of cultural
heritage. In contrast, in Anglo-American jurisprudence, ... the grandparent is
an outsider whose intrusion into the nuclear family is subject to strict
constitutional oversight.
Id. at 656.
240. See Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 275 n.1 (defining a
"'cultural minority' member as an individual whose core religious, political or social
values and beliefs differ meaningfully and substantially from majoritarian norms").
241. See supra note 180 (discussing the debate over "marriage model"). In recent
work, many lesbian feminist theorists have expressly rejected assimilation into traditional
marital family categories. For summaries of this literature, see Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian
Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
34, 70-73 (1994); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of
Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1299, 1318-20 (1997). For a sampling of
such views, see, for example, Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning
Lesbians in Legal Theory, in SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL: FRAGMENTS IN LESBIAN
LEGAL THEORY 153, 153-54 (1998) (calling for lesbians to resist rather than attempt to
redefine family because the "legal notion of family domesticates lesbians through its
strategies of demarcation, assimilation, coercion, indoctrination, and arrogation"); Paula
L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, NAT'L
LESBIAN & GAY Q. 9, 14 (Fall 1989) ("Marriage, as it exists today, is antithetical to my
liberation as a lesbian and as a woman because it mainstreams my life and voice. I do not
want to be known as 'Mrs. Attached-To-Somebody-Else.' Nor do I want to give the state
the power to regulate my primary relationship."); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What
We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal
Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993) ("I believe that
the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of
mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays
the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism.").
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For those excluded from the family paradigm, the effects can be
emotionally as well as financially devastating. Decedents are unable
to die secure in the knowledge that they have provided for dependent
loved ones. Survivors find themselves "treat[ed] ... as if they were
strangers"2 42 to the individuals with whom they shared years of
affection, intimacy, and companionship. But the family paradigm cuts
even more deeply.243 Its discriminatory rules do not just affect
inheritance. They also send a message to society that only some
human relationships and losses matter.2 "
4. Judges and Jurors: Corruption of the Process
The family paradigm encourages judges and jurors to "bend" the
law to ensure "appropriate" distribution of decedents' estates.
Treatment of nonconforming wills presents the most obvious
example. To effectuate the testator's "natural" intent as opposed to
actual, expressed intent, the family paradigm encourages judges and
jurors to use elastic mental capacity doctrines to overturn validly
executed wills and redirect assets to the testator's closest family
members. Even in its injustices, the family paradigm promotes such
"bending." The so-called "fixed rules"245 of status-based intestacy
turn out to be more flexible than acknowledged. When these rules
cause injustice in a particular case, judges can turn to equitable
doctrines and remedies. They create often elaborate fictions
246-
242. Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 89 (arguing that "the law treats
committed partners as if they were strangers to each other").
243. Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law, supra note 5, at 1064-65
(discussing the "typical intestacy statute's" two "cut[s] against gay people"). According to
Professor Spitko, the "first cut" is to "den[y] gay men and lesbians equal donative
freedom." Id. at 1064. The "second cut" is the "discriminatory message"; "such disparate
treatment devalues gay men and lesbians and their relationships." Id. at 1064-65.
244. Arriola, supra note 233, at 694 (criticizing the view that "love and feelings in some
relationships just do not matter because the resident status, or sexual status, or human
rights status of these relationships is not traditional or legal" and asking "but are the
feelings connected to human loss really any different in a 'non-traditional' family than in a
'traditional' one").
245. See Glendon, supra note 135, passim.
246. See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). In a recent article, Professor
Adam Hirsch has presented a comprehensive analysis of this judicial use of what he calls
"legal contraptions," with extensive reference to trusts and estates examples. Adam J.
Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79
OR. L. REV. 527, 538 (2000) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inheritance Law]. Professor Hirsch
argues that legal contraptions arise "when a lawmaking body operates from below and
seeks to find a way around superior rules," id. at 538, or when "legal actors operating from
below" seek to apply a rule "for secondary purposes not originally contemplated by its
creators, to which the rule proves seredipitiously suited." Id. at 538 n.40. He identifies
several typical characteristics of legal contraptions-they often "incorporate and depend
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mythical contracts, 247 constructive trusts,248 virtual legitimation249-- to
redefine the decedent's family to include the "deserving" and exclude
the "unworthy."
The effect of such bending of the law is to corrupt the judges and
jurors who engage in it and the process they administer. When they
respond to the family paradigm under the cloak of testator's intent or
fixed rules, they exercise the most dangerous form of discretion-
discretion with no transparent rules, standards, or procedures by
which to maintain accountability. Yet, this practice is so prevalent
that it is common knowledge among lawyers and even taught in law
schools.250  The judicial subterfuge encouraged by the family
paradigm harms all touched by the inheritance system. For decedents
and survivors, it creates unpredictability, uncertainty, and added legal
expenses. For the public at large, it undermines confidence in the
fairness and neutrality of the inheritance system. For the legal
upon fictitious factual assumptions"; "function through growth of another branch of the
law that comes within the subordinate lawmaker's power"; "subsist despite internal,
logical contradictions"; "are atomistic, offering multiple solutions for the same doctrinal
problem"; and "display imperfections." Id. at 539.
247. This occurs, for example, in the case of equitable adoption. See supra note 43. As
Professor Hirsch has observed of this approach, "some courts conjecture an implicit
contract to adopt and proceed to enforce it (post-mortem!) by equitable decree of specific
performance. Other courts assume detrimental reliance on the part of the unsuspecting,
but in truth uncomprehending, child, and provide redress through equitable estoppel."
Hirsch, Inheritance Law, supra note 246, at 548. For an extended discussion and examples,
see id. at 548-51.
248. Courts have used constructive trusts, for example, to prevent inheritance by an
heir who murdered the decedent. Under the constructive trust approach, the "legal title
passes to the slayer but equity holds him to be a constructive trustee for the heirs or next
of kin of the decedent." In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 477 (Vt. 1966). The
constructive trust has no real substance. It is simply a "subterfuge," Fellows, The Slayer
Rule, supra note 39, at 550, that allows courts "to circumvent" an inheritance rule "while
continuing formally to observe it." Hirsch, Inheritance Law, supra note 246, at 537.
249. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 132 (discussing judicial doctrines of
"virtual or equitable legitimation to allow a nonmarital son to inherit from his biological
father").
250. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 537:
"[Ljack of testamentary capacity," "undue influence," and "fraud" are subtle and
elastic concepts that can be used by judges and juries to rewrite the testator's
distributive plan in order to "do justice." In contests by disinherited children,
judges and juries are frequently influenced by their sympathies for the children.
This is well known to practicing lawyers, who will often advise the devisees to
agree to an out-of-court settlement with a disinherited child.
See also Rivera, supra note 54, at 892 (stating that "knowledgeable attorneys drawing wills
for gay folks knew special problems existed" and that in undue influence attacks raised by
biological family members "such wills have been set aside by the courts based solely on
the effect that the homosexuality of the testator supposedly had on the will").
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profession, it encourages cynicism and even "disdain""1 for the
inheritance process and those who administer it.
5. Individuals: Subjugation to the Abstract
Professor Jane Baron has written eloquently of the harms caused
by will interpretation approaches that ignore the actual people
involved and instead define people by category aloneY 2  She has
observed that "[tihere is something deeply dissatisfying about a
system that protects individuals only by depriving them of their
humanity.' '253  Yet, that is precisely what occurs under the family
paradigm. The family paradigm disregards individual human needs,
desires, foibles, and circumstances. It reduces individuals to their
"family" relationships. Did they have the requisite status as family
members? Did they act as family members? Did the decedent define
them as family members? Under the family paradigm, the "natural"
triumphs over the actual1 4 the "average" over the particular, 5 and
the abstract over the individual.
6
In the end, this devaluation of the individual may be the greatest
human cost of the family paradigm and most compelling reason for
reform.257 The next section of this Article will explore possible new
251. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 5, at 34 (arguing that an objective of inheritance
law should be "to produce a pattern of distribution [that] ... doesn't produce... disdain
for the legal system").
252. Baron, supra note 4, at 633-34.
253. Id. at 655.
254. See supra Part I (discussing the inheritance system's preference for "natural
objects of the decedent's bounty"-close family members-over the decedent's actual
desired recipients of her estate).
255. For example, in intestate succession law, the "average" decedent's preferences
prevail over those of a particular decedent. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at
74 (stating that the "primary policy" of intestacy statutes "is to carry out the probable
intent of the average intestate decedent").
256. For example, under a status-based approach, abstract notions of how family
members should behave are more important for inheritance purposes than how
individuals actually behaved toward the decedent. See supra Parts L.A, III.A.1; see also
Baron, supra note 4, at 654 (criticizing will interpretation approaches for "abstracting
individuals").
257. For a different view, see Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, supra note 54, at
657. Professor Fellows recognizes that "the law furthers donative freedom for the
majority of property owners by forsaking individuality." Id. at 613. She cites the adverse
impact of this approach, in particular the "preference for family," on "nontraditional
distribution schemes that exclude some family members in favor of other family or
nonfamily members." Id. Nonetheless, based on "analysis [that] abandons the
romanticism of individuality," she ultimately concludes that "concern about the law's
inadequacy to preserve individuality should not divert efforts to facilitate donative
freedom for the majority of property owners." Id. at 657.
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directions for American inheritance law that might reclaim the
individual forgotten by the family paradigm.
B. Beyond the Family Paradigm
The preceding section described the reasons why the inheritance
system should break out of the family paradigm. What sort of regime
should replace that paradigm depends upon a variety of factors. They
include social and cultural values, considerations of cost and
efficiency, the need for coordination of the inheritance system with
other socio-legal systems, and political limitations.
Another consideration is the readiness of the probate courts to
administer the new regime. No alternative system is likely to be as
rigid and mechanical as the current one. The best options are likely
to vest greater responsibility in the courts. Leading scholars have
opined that probate courts are not yet ready to assume that
responsibility25 Many probate judges are not lawyers, 9 and probate
courts have sometimes been shown to be corrupt.2 But the fact that
the infrastructure necessary to support a reform is not entirely in
place is not an argument against the reform, but merely a cost to be
weighed.26'
258. Currently, "the weight of opinion in this country opposes" adoption of a more
flexible approach to estate distribution based on the English model "because of the vast
discretion such a system gives to the probate judge." DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 15, at 478. For examples of such views, see Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of
Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1303, 1305-07
(1969); Glendon, supra note 135, at 1186-89; Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 12, at 314.
259. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
482 (5th ed. 1995) (stating that "probate judges in some states do not have to be trained as
lawyers; anyone can run for the office").
260. For discussions of such problems among New York Surrogate Courts, see
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 212-13; John H. Langbein, Will Contests,
103 YALE LJ. 2039 (1994) (book review). See also NORMAN F. DACEY, How To AvOID
PROBATE! 15 (1965) (claiming that the probate system as a whole is "almost universally
corrupt" and providing strategies and forms to "avoid probate"). For the most recent
edition of Dacey's book, see NORMAN F. DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE! (5th ed.
1993).
261. American bankruptcy administration has recently undergone the kind of
transformation that would be necessary. Interview with Lynn M. LoPucki, Security Pacific
Bank Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Aug. 1, 2000). Prior
to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, bankruptcy cases were administered by "referees."
Id. The referees were appointed locally by the U.S. District Judges and had status roughly
equal to U.S. Magistrates. Id. Prominent firms complained of a corrupt "bankruptcy
ring" composed of bankruptcy lawyers and referees that controlled the outcomes of cases.
Id. The 1978 legislation created a bankruptcy court whose judges had broad jurisdiction,
contempt powers, and higher salaries. Id, Some referees became bankruptcy judges, but
many did not. Id. Turnover was high in the early years. Id. But in less than two decades,
the transition had advanced to the point that expressions of concern regarding honesty
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Choice of the particular direction that reform should take is
beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, I intend to show that
reasonable alternatives to family-based inheritance exist and, in so
doing, to demonstrate that family-based inheritance is only a
paradigm and not a reality. The five approaches discussed here are
not exhaustive or mutually exclusive.
1. Abolishing Inheritance
One response to the family paradigm is to abolish inheritance
altogether. As this Article has shown, the family paradigm has long
privileged one part of American society over others. It has promoted
transmission of wealth within only those cultural groups whose
"natural objects" match conventional family definitions. In
perpetuating this narrow vision of family, inheritance law has created
wide disparities in wealth, economic power, and opportunity 62 Thus,
some reformers may conclude that the optimal way to root out such
inequalities is to abolish not only the family paradigm but also
inheritance itself.263 Under such a scheme, property owned at death
would escheat to the government.
A proposal to abolish inheritance is unlikely to generate
significant support, however. As Professor Ascher observed in 1990,
"Inheritance... seem[s] to occupy a special place in the hearts of
many Americans, even those who cannot realistically expect to inherit
anything of significance. '264 After a decade of economic prosperity,
public support for inheritance has only intensified, to the point that
sixty percent of Americans of all ethnic groups favor repeal of the
federal estate tax.265 On May 26, 2001, Congress enacted legislation
that will phase out the unpopular "death tax" by 2010.2 6
and competency are no more prevalent with respect to bankruptcy judges than other
federal judges. Id.
262. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 15 ("The most powerful argument
against permitting transmission of wealth is that the transfer of great fortunes perpetuates
wide disparities in the distribution of wealth, concentrates inherited economic power in
the hands of a few, and denies equality of opportunity to the poorer.").
263. For an extended discussion and analysis of existing proposals to "curtail" or
abolish inheritance, see Ascher, supra note 125, at 70-76, 87-99.
264. Id. at 75. This public support for inheritance is by no means an exclusively
American phenomenon. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 18 (discussing
failed efforts to abolish inheritance in Soviet Russia due to public resistance); Frances
Foster-Simons, The Development of Inheritance Law in the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 33, 36-37, 57-61 (1985) (discussing initial efforts to
abolish inheritance in Soviet Russia and reasons for retaining inheritance).
265. See Jacob M. Schlesinger & Nicholas Kulish, Will Power: As Paper Millionaires
Multiply, Estate Tax Takes a Public Beating, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2000, at Al (citing June
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Important societal justifications for inheritance exist.
Inheritance can, as Professor Halbach remarked, "serve as an
incentive to bring forth creativity, hard work, initiative, and
ultimately productivity that benefits others, as well as encouraging
individual responsibility-encouraging those who can to make
provision that society would otherwise have to make for those who
are or may be dependents."'267 But perhaps the most persuasive
argument for retaining inheritance is its impact at a deeply personal
level. Inheritance can give an individual the "great comfort and
satisfaction to know during life that, even after death, those whom
one cares about can be provided for and may be able to enjoy better
lives because of the inheritance that can be left to them."2'
The following subsections will outline possible approaches to
reform rather than abolish inheritance. As even one of the leading
Congressional opponents of estate tax repeal has acknowledged,
"These days, I think everybody, regardless of color, can aspire to
having some kind of estate.... You don't come in at a time when
people are raising their expectations and tell them you're thinking of
taking it away."269 The better approach is to search for reforms that
will extend the benefits of inheritance to all Americans, including
those whose lives do not conform to the family paradigm.
2. Purging "Family" from the Paradigm
The most obvious means of removing the family paradigm from
inheritance law is simply to eliminate the rules that implement it. For
example, one might eliminate the presumptions in favor of family
members as the "natural objects of the decedent's bounty." While
the repeal of particular rules that privilege family members might
2000 Gallup poll).
266. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001) (repealing the estate tax on estates of decedents dying
after December 31, 2009). Unless Congress passes future legislation, however, the repeal
is only temporary. The Act contains a sunset provision that will automatically reinstate
the estate tax in 2011. Id. § 901(a)(2), (b), 115 Stat. at 150 (stating that with respect to
estates of decedents dying after December 31, 2010, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
will apply as if the provisions and amendments made by the Act had never been enacted).
For discussions of the sunset provision and the uncertainty it has created for taxpayers and
estate planners, see, for example, CCH, TAX LEGISLATION 2001: LAW, EXPLANATION
AND ANALYSIS 3, 99-101, 637 (2001); Martin M. Shenkman, Estate Tax Repeal; What Are
Your Colleagues Doing?, NJ. LAW., July 2,2001, at 7; David Cay Johnston, Coping With a
Tax That Has Nine Lives, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,2001, § 3, at 1.
267. Halbach, supra note 32, at 5.
268. Id.
269. Schlesinger & Kulish, supra note 265 (quoting Rep. Charles Rangel).
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improve the inheritance system, mere repeal offers no escape from
the family paradigm. That paradigm is so pervasive that elimination
of the rules implementing it would in many-if not most-cases leave
us with no answer to the question "who gets the decedent's
property?" In intestate succession, for example, family-privileging
rules currently are the only alternative to escheat to the state.27°
3. Appending Non-family Categories to the Family Paradigm
Another possible approach is to keep the family paradigm in
place but add new categories that would not require family
membership for inheritance. For example, inheritance rights could be
extended as well to "dependents" of the decedent regardless of family
status. Several foreign countries have already adopted variants of this
approach.271 A few U.S. scholars have recommended similar reforms
for the American inheritance system. Professor Gaubatz, for
example, has offered a scheme to protect not only the decedent's
relatives but also "those dependent upon the decedent at the time of
his death under circumstances which would lead to the expectation of
continued support. ' z7 z In brief, his proposal would give a decedent's
dependent273 the right in both testate and intestate situations to
petition the court for a distribution of the decedent's estate that
deviates from that specified in the will or intestacy statute.2 74 The
court would hold a hearing to determine the claimant's eligibility,
circumstances of the dependency, and specific support
requirements.2 75 Based on these findings, the court could then order
distribution of "reasonable amounts" from the decedent's estate to
reflect such factors as the claimant's "need," "affective relationship to
270. See supra Part I.A.
271. For example, England recognizes claims by any person maintained by the
decedent immediately prior to the decedent's death. Inheritance (Provision for Family
and Dependants) Act, 1975, c. 1, § (1)(e) (Eng.). Many former socialist countries give
nonrelated individuals who were dependent on the decedent for at least one year prior to
the decedent's death intestate succession rights. See, e.g., Czech Republic Civil Code
§§ 474(1), 475 (amended 1998), reprinted in Jifi Kocourek, Ob~ansk Zdkonik [Civil Law]
139 (1998) (providing intestate succession rights to "people who lived with the decedent
for at least one year prior to the decedent's death in a common household and ... were
dependent on the decedent for their maintenance"); Uzbekistan Civil Code art. 1141
(1996), translated in CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC UZBEKISTAN 464 (W.E. Butler ed.
and trans., 1997) (providing intestate succession rights to "persons lacking labour capacity
who for not less than one year before the death of the decedent were dependent on him
and resided jointly with him").
272. Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 559.
273. Professor Gaubatz's proposal also applies to a relative of the decedent. Id. at 562.
274. Id. at 562-63.
275. Id.
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the decedent," "legal obligation of the decedent to support the
claimant during life, aid furnished decedent by the claimant during
the decedent's life, and treatment in the will [or under intestacy] of
others similarly situated.
276
Or the inheritance system could go still further and expand its
concept of "natural" recipients of the decedent's estate to include
those in actual "support relationships" with the decedent, again with
no requirement of family membership. This scheme would
encompass both possible support relationships between decedent and
claimant: (1) where the decedent supported the claimant; and (2)
where the claimant supported the decedent. As I have discussed
elsewhere,277  this broad recognition of support needs and
contributions is an integral part of the distinctive Chinese inheritance
model. Under such an approach, intestate succession law would
continue to base inheritance rights on family status; that is, the
decedent's closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage would
remain eligible intestate heirs. In addition, however, it would
recognize nonheirs in a "support relationship" with the decedent-
extended family members, steprelatives, in-laws, and nonrelatives
alike. A variety of remedies could be used to include such claimants.
China, for example, employs three distinct remedies. It accords some
dependents and caregivers equal status with legal family members,
elevates others to the highest "first order" heir status, and awards to
still others "appropriate" distributions from the estate to reflect their
individual support needs or contributions.2 78
This recognition of support relationships could have a direct
impact on other areas of the inheritance system as well. It could
result in expanded protections for family and nonrelated dependents
from disinheritance by will.2 79 Moreover, it could soften the
resistance to wills and contracts to devise that leave property to
caregivers00 Caregivers could be regarded as "natural" recipients of
276. Id.
277. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 107.
278. See id. at 1237-39, 1241-45 (summarizing the Chinese approach). By rewarding
support contributions to the decedent's welfare, Chinese intestacy law, unlike its U.S.
counterpart, recognizes the desert of claimants. See supra notes 44-50, 159 and
accompanying text (discussing the failure of U.S. intestacy rules to factor in exemplary
behavior toward the decedent).
279. This is precisely what has occurred in China. See Foster, Linking Support and
Inheritance, supra note 107, at 1219-30 (setting out Chinese protections for disinherited
dependents both within and outside the decedent's nuclear family). Interestingly, China
has not given caregivers similar protections from disinheritance. Id. at 1249-50.
280. See id. at 1245-54 (contrasting the Chinese and U.S. approaches to wills and
contracts to devise with caregivers as beneficiaries).
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a testator's estate. Thus, a testator's efforts to reward acts of care
would no longer be presumed suspicious. Under this new model, a
testator would have genuine donative freedom to leave property to
caregivers, even at the expense of her "closest" (but not dependent)
family members.281
There are, of course, numerous other categories that might be
used to extend inheritance rights to those excluded by the family
paradigm. The strategy, however, would be the same. The new
category would simply be appended to the family paradigm. While
this approach would be an improvement over the existing system, it
has significant limitations. In effect, this approach defines the
decedent's "natural objects" as family and "others." Rather than
confronting the mindset that distorts the inheritance process-
namely, the preference for family members-it merely suggests that
additional deserving recipients of the decedent's property might exist.
In practice, this approach continues to allow and even encourage
lawmakers and courts to regard family ties as primary. The
nonconforming individual thus remains at risk that her estate plan
will be rewritten after her death to ensure dispositions to the "most"
natural recipients, her closest family members. Without a
fundamental change in legal culture as well as rules,' this approach
will likely make a difference only at the margins.
In addition, a definition of "natural objects" as family and
"others" fails to address adequately the larger discriminatory message
of the American inheritance system. It continues to relegate those
outside the family to second-class status. In so doing, it fails to
"remove the badge of inferiority"283 on those excluded from the
family paradigm, the badge that shapes both how society views such
281. See id. at 1246, 1251-52 (discussing the Chinese approach).
282. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers'
Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1498, 1535 & n.178 (1996) (arguing that "[fliddling with the
written law typically has little effect on legal outcomes" and that "change requires
community action at the level of the shared mental model, as opposed to mere legislative
or judicial pronouncements"). For definitions of "legal culture," see, for example,
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECrIVE 15
(1975) ("those parts of the general culture-customs, opinions, ways of doing and
thinking-that bend social forces towards or away from the law and in particular ways");
MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIvE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND CASES 8 (1985) ("the network of values and attitudes relating to law and practic[e]").
For an examination of one country's conscious efforts to create a new legal culture, see
Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Development of Legal Culture:
Russian Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 923 passin
(1997) (discussing the post-Soviet Russian experience).
283. Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law, supra note 5, at 1107.
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individuals and how they view themselves.' Thus, the twenty-first
century may well require, as Professor Gaubatz put it, "an entirely
different picture of inheritance."' 5
The remainder of this Article will consider what that new picture
of inheritance might look like. The next subsections will describe two
approaches that would transcend the family paradigm. Exposition
and defense of new paradigms are beyond the scope of this Article.
The purpose of the following subsections is merely to demonstrate
that alternative approaches that do not operate within the family
paradigm are possible. They should be considered as examples of
directions that future research may take and not as concrete
proposals.
4. Decedent Intent Approach
As Professor Fellows has observed, "Donative transfer law...
does not accomplish the property owner's will, but accomplishes only
the property owner's will as the state identifies it."' 26 Under the family
paradigm, the state uses this power to impose a preference for family
members. Thus, another possible response to the family paradigm is
to adopt a new approach to inheritance that emphasizes the
decedent's actual intent rather than the state's interpretation of that
intent.
The decedent intent approach would essentially take Professor
Herndndez's proposal for a "decedent-controlled definition of
family' '287 a step further. It too would abandon the status-based
preference for "legal" family members and instead determine
inheritance rights by "thoroughly assessing who are the natural
objects of a particular... testator's bounty."' Unlike Professor
Hermindez's proposal, however, this approach would transcend the
family paradigm by containing no "family" limitation whatsoever. It
would encompass all individuals the decedent defined as her "natural
objects," including those the decedent neither recognized nor treated
as "family" members.
284. Id. at 1100-01 (stating that "succession law reform has great potential to change
the way our society views gay men and lesbians and, indeed, how gay men and lesbians
view themselves"); see also Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 8, 91
(arguing that intestacy statutes "reflect" and "shape [social] norms and values by
recognizing and legitimating relationships" and also "shape the relations of the partners to
each other and to their children").
285. Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 562.
286. Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, supra note 54, at 612.
287. See supra notes 168-70, 194 and accompanying text.
288. Hern~ndez, supra note 10, at 1018.
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As a starting point, the decedent intent approach would make
freedom of testation in fact "[t]he first principle of the law of wills.
''2 9
The inheritance system would give utmost respect to any validly
executed will that clearly29° recorded the decedent's donative
preferences even if that will excluded the decedent's closest family
members. In effect, the "unnatural disposition" would become the
"natural disposition." This would have significant implications for
mental capacity doctrines and rules. Mental capacity requirements
would now focus exclusively on protection of testators and not family
survivors. As a result, the decedent intent approach would raise the
bar in mental capacity challenges. Courts would overturn a will only
in exceptional circumstances where strong evidence exists that the
will fails to reflect the actual intent of the particular testator due to
senility, fraud, duress, and the like. Under the decedent intent
approach, no presumption would be made that a mentally sound
testator would prefer family members.2 91 Will proponents would no
longer have to defend a testator's unequal distribution of the estate
among family members, failure to name a family member correctly,
or exclusion of family altogether. The conventional test of mental
capacity-whether the testator understood who constituted her
closest family membersa9 -would disappear. Under the decedent
intent approach, the testator herself, rather than a one-size-fits-all
intestacy statute, would control the definition of her own natural
objects.
The decedent intent approach would also result in significant
changes in construction and interpretation of wills. Current
approaches give insufficient weight to the actual intent of the testator.
For example, under what Professors Langbein and Waggoner have
289. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
489, 491 (1975) ("The first principle of the law of wills is freedom of testation.").
290. See Baron, supra note 4, at 659 (describing "clear" will commands as "in the sense
of being complete, comprehensible, and in accord with the reader's expectations").
291. Hernindez, supra note 10, at 1018 n.260 (describing natural objects as individuals
whom a " 'mentally sound testator would be expected to favor, such as spouse or children
or other close relatives' ") (quoting MARK REUTLINGER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
53 (2d ed. 1998)). See In re Sechrest, 140 N.C. App. 464, 469, 537 S.E.2d 511, 515 (2000),
rev. denied, 353 N.C. 375, 547 S.E.2d 16 (2001) (defining as two of the factors indicating
undue influence that the will "is made in favor of one with whom there are no ties of
blood" and "[t]hat it disinherits the natural objects of [the testator's] bounty").
292. See Hernindez, supra note 10, at 1018 & n.260 (stating that "[a] mental incapacity
challenge to a will is based in part on whether a testator understood who were the persons
who were natural objects of his bounty" and arguing that "[slome probate court judges




called the" 'no-reformation' rule,"2 93 courts have traditionally refused
to remedy mistakes in wills to "giv[e] effect to the testator's actual but
defectively expressed intention."294 Similarly, in interpretation of will
language, courts have adopted an approach that, as Professor Baron
has put it, is "just plain strange. '295 They exclude extrinsic evidence
of how the testator actually intended to devise the estate and instead
determine that intent from the words alone.
296
Likewise, where the testator leaves "gaps" in the will, the actual
intent of the testator is largely ignored. As Professor Mann has
noted, existing approaches to such gaps "apply on the basis of a
presumed intent that bears no necessary relationship to the individual
case at hand."2' One illustration is the treatment of lapse-where a
beneficiary predeceases the testator and the will fails to specify how
to handle that beneficiary's bequest.298 In these situations, courts do
not attempt to determine what the particular testator would have
wanted under the circumstances 99 Instead, they mechanically apply
the jurisdiction's antilapse statute, which resolves the issue based on
the presumed intent of testators.2° Under the family paradigm, that
presumed intent usually translates into a preference for close family
members.
The decedent intent approach, in contrast, would recognize that
"[r]eal people, not abstractions, write wills."30 1 It would make actual
intent rather than presumed intent the standard for construction and
293. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground
of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 521 (1982)
[hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills].
294. Id. at 522.
295. Baron, supra note 4, at 663.
296. This is the so-called "plain meaning rule," which Professors Langbein and
Waggoner have called the "no-extrinsic-evidence rule." Langbein & Waggoner,
Reformation of Wills, supra note 293, at 521. As Professor Baron has explained, under the
plain meaning rule, "the task of interpretation is focused not on discovering the testator's
wishes, but rather on decoding his words." Baron, supra note 4, at 637; see also Adam J.
Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1115-25 (1996) (discussing
the plain meaning rule and placing the rule in the context of linguistic theory).
297. Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46, at 1053.
298. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
299. See Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46, at 1055 ("With the single
exception of Nev Jersey, however, courts do not inquire into what testators would have
wanted.... Although one could construct an antilapse statute that elicited an
approximation of testators' likely intent by a finely contextualized analysis of family
relations and the overall estate plan, no state has.").
300. Id. at 1054-56 (arguing that antilapse statutes apply "mechanically" based on the
"presumed intent of decedents.., with little or no regard for what individual testators
might have intended").
301. Baron, supra note 4, at 664.
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interpretation of wills. Recent judicial experience and scholarly
literature suggest some possible avenues. For example, the decedent
intent approach might follow the lead of New Jersey courts and
introduce a "doctrine of probable intent," under which courts would
look beyond "words and phrases in the will" and "see[k] to find what
[the testator] would subjectively have desired had he in fact actually
addressed the contingency which has arisen."'302  Or the decedent
intent approach might go still further, as Professors Langbein and
Waggoner have recommended, and abandon the "no-reformation
rule" for a scheme that would allow courts to remedy mistakes where
the testator's actual intent can be proved. 3 Ultimately, the decedent
intent approach might choose, as Professor Baron has suggested, "to
actualize the system's goal of testamentary freedom" by considering
individual testators' entire "stories, in all their richness and detail.""°
The decedent intent approach would likely result in major
changes in will execution formalities as well. As leading scholars in
the field have emphasized, existing rules that effectuate intent in
theory defeat intent in the real world.30 5 Documents that decedents
clearly intend to be their wills may be declared void for even the most
minor deviations from statutory formalities.3 6 At worst, under the
302. Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 894 (N.J. 1977). This approach presents its own
problems. It requires courts to consider "counterfactuals"-"proposition[sJ ... that
depic[t] what would have been the case had things been otherwise." Vanessa Laird, Note,
Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Application of the Cy
Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 978 (1988). For a discussion of general difficulties
encountered in using counterfactuals, see id. at 977-84 and sources cited in id. at 978-79
nn.36-40. For other critiques of the "doctrine of probable intent," see Langbein &
Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 293, at 558-62 (describing this doctrine as
"inarticulate, unsupported, untested, [and] unpredictable").
303. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 293, at 577-90 (setting
out proposal). This approach has been adopted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
304. Baron, supra note 4, at 666.
305. As Professor Langbein has stated, "In dealing with.., botched wills, Anglo-
American courts have produced one of the cruelest chapters that survives in the common
law. Purely technical violations that could in no way cast doubt on the authenticity or
finality of wills are held to invalidate the offending instrument." John H. Langbein, The
Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A. J. 1192, 1193 (1979).
For a review of the literature, see Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46; C.
Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An
Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement
Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167 (pt. 1), 599 (pt. 2) (1991) (discussing the forces
influencing the development of the Code's "Harmless Error" rule).
306. Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46, at 1036 ("Courts have routinely
invalidated wills for minor defects in form even in uncontested cases and sometimes even
while conceding-always ruefully, of course-that the document clearly represents the
wishes and intent of the testator."); see also Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and
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family paradigm, judges manipulate execution formalities to deny
probate to wills that fail to leave property to family members. °7
The scholarly literature suggests a variety of reforms that the
decedent intent approach might adopt to promote testamentary
intent."' Under Professor Langbein's proposed harmless-error
rule, °9 it could address "harmless errors" in will execution by
allowing courts to "dispense" with testamentary formalities in cases
where clear and convincing evidence exists that the decedent adopted
the formally defective document as his will. 1 Another possible
Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 49 (1985) (discussing cases in
which courts declared wills invalid due to execution defects even though "there was little
or no question that the testator had intended the instrument to be a will").
307. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, supra note 9, at 258-68 (finding that
courts have manipulated will execution formalities as well as mental capacity doctrines to
overturn wills that fail to provide for immediate family members). Professor Spitko views
this trend as particularly disturbing "because there does not appear to be any 'innocent'
explanation for such a finding." Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 14, at 285.
He states "[i]t is simply not tenable to argue that testators who prefer non-relatives to
family members are less likely to comply with the testamentary formalities required for
the execution of a will-principally, that the testator put her will in writing, sign the will
and have the will attested to by witnesses." Id.
308. An extended discussion of this literature is well beyond the scope of this Article.
Numerous reform proposals exist beyond those mentioned in this Article that should be
considered by architects of the decedent intent approach. See, e.g., Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, supra note 289 (setting out substantial compliance reform
proposal).
309. John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report
on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 passim (1987)
(setting out the harmless-error proposal). The original formulation of the harmless-error
rule was codified in the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended
1997), 8 U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2001):
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in
compliance with Section 2-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had
been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document
or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended the document or writing to constitute (i) the decedent's will, (ii) a
partial or complete revocation of the will, (iii) an addition to or an alteration of
the will, or (iv) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will
or of a formerly revoked portion of the will.
310. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999) (stating the current formulation of the harmless-error rule as "[a]
harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the proponent establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent adopted the document as his or her will"). For
examples of cases in which courts have used a harmless-error approach to excuse defects
in will execution, see id. § 3.3 reporter's note 2. These cases include Estate of Black, 641
P.2d 754, 755 (Cal. 1982) (upholding a holographic will written on a pre-printed will form
even though the statute required a holographic will to be "entirely written, dated, and
signed by the testator himself"); In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1345-46 (N.J. 1991)
(holding that a will could be admitted to probate even though witnesses signed only the
self-proving affidavit and not the will itself). But see In re Estate of Sky Dancer, 13 P.3d
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response would be to minimize formalities3 11 and remove those
requirements that most often frustrate intent. For example, the
decedent intent approach might conclude, as Professor Lindgren has,
that the witnessing requirement for wills is "mainly a trap for the
unwary '312 and should be abolished.313 Or it could even, as Professor
Baron has suggested, abandon . will execution requirements
altogether.
314
1231, 1233-34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding after review of foreign "harmless-error"
legislation and case law that Colorado's harmless-error statute could not validate a will
that was "not executed at all").
311. For an extended review of such proposals, see Miller, supra note 305, at 289-91.
312. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV.
541,572 (1990).
313. Id at 569. Although Professor Lindgren advocates elimination of the witnessing
requirement for will validity, he also favors encouragement of routine witnessing of wills.
See icL at 547, 569-72 (setting out a "two-tiered approach ... [to] ensure routine
attestation by witnesses without making it mandatory"). He explores several possible
statutory, id. at 570-71 (discussing statutes that would require attestation but not
invalidate a will for violating the attestation requirement and statutes that would penalize
the drafter rather than invalidate the will for attestation defects), evidentiary, id. at 571
(discussing heightened evidentiary standards to prove genuineness of unwitnessed wills),
and equitable approaches. James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009,
1024-27 (1992) (discussing equitable solutions for "[florgiving attestation mistakes," with
particular focus on the Uniform Probate Code's "dispensing power"). Professor Lindgren
concludes that the optimal approach is an adapted version of the current "self-proving
affidavit." Lindgren, supra note 312, at 547, 569-70 (arguing that "self-proving affidavits
could be adapted to ensure routine attestation without requiring it for formal validity").
Self-proving affidavits, an "invention of the Uniform Probate Code that has proven very
popular," DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 245, are sworn, signed, and
notarized statements by the testator and witnesses that the will was duly executed, id.
(discussing self-proving affidavits). Self-proving affidavits are optional and are not
formally required for will validity; however, they allow a will to be probated without the
appearance of witnesses. Lindgren, supra note 312, at 570 (explaining the effect of self-
proving affidavits). See generally Mann, supra note 306 (providing an extended discussion
of self-proving affidavits). Professor Lindgren argues that the self-proving affidavit thus
encourages testators to use witnesses without penalizing them for failing to do so.
Lindgren, supra note 312, at 570, 571-72 (explaining the advantages of the self-proving
affidavit and proposing to encourage attestation by "us[ing] a carrot, easier proof in court
for attested wills" rather than a "stick[,... ] punishing those who fail [to comply]").
314. Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155,202-03 (1989) (arguing
that "the law adopts intent-defeating requirements for donative transfers" and thus "there
is a case to be made for abandoning the formal rules that presently govern donative
transfers"). Or the decedent intent approach could go in the opposite direction and
consider reform proposals to "maximize" formalities to effectuate intent. See Miller,
supra note 305, at 292-302 (discussing proposals for notarial wills, self-proving wills, ante-
mortem probate, and videotaped wills); see also Bonfield, supra note 195, at 1917-18
(stating that the author "shall swim against the tide, and support even greater formalism in
the law of wills than presently obtains" and proposing the notarial system for will
authentication).
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The decedent intent approach could transform intestacy as well.
Here, more than anywhere else in American inheritance law,
presumed intent controls. A statutory intestacy scheme that
purportedly reflects the "normal desires '3 15 of decedents trumps even
the most irrefutable evidence of an individual decedent's actual
intent. Yet, empirical studies have shown that decedents would
seldom deliberately choose the particular estate plan imposed on
them by intestacy law.316 Decedents die intestate for a variety of
reasons. They fail to write wills due to laziness, cost, distaste for
lawyers, inability to confront their own mortality, or for other
reasons.317 A recent survey of committed partners has underscored
another important factor, error.318 Many decedents die intestate
because they have a mistaken understanding of who will inherit their
estate under intestacy rules.319
315. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt.1, gen. cmt. (1969) (amended 1990).
316. See Monica K. Johnson & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Using Social Science to Inform
the Law of Intestacy: The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 479, 489 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson & Robbennolt, Using Social Science]
(summarizing studies). In one study, "[n]o participants ... indicated that their satisfaction
with the intestacy scheme was their reason for not writing a will." Id (referring to Rita J.
Simon et al., Public Opinion About Property Distribution at Death, 5 MARRIAGE & FAM.
REV. 25 (1982)). But see Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the
United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1303, 1313 (1969) (arguing that "a
willingness by almost half of any group of decedents to allow their property to pass by
intestacy does not suggest serious disaffection with the intestacy laws").
317. See Johnson & Robbennolt, Using Social Science, supra note 316, at 489
(summarizing findings of empirical studies); see also DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 15, at 71 (discussing reasons why people do not write wills). As Professor Guzman
has recently underscored, the situation of minor children is particularly "poignant."
Guzman, supra note 143, at 80. With only limited exceptions, jurisdictions will not
recognize wills written by testators under the age of eighteen. See id. at 80 n.12 (setting
out exceptions). As a result:
[u]nlike other intestacy scenarios where statutes of descent and distribution apply
only in default of exercised testamentary freedom, heirs of a child are "forced" in
every literal sense. The child may not elect to favor or even disinherit one parent
over the other, meaning that people with little or no financial, social, or
emotional connection to the child could profit from that child's death.
Id. at 80.
318. This refers to the survey of committed opposite-sex and same-sex partners
conducted by Professor Fellows and her colleagues at the University of Minnesota. See
Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6. Analysis of the statistics regarding
respondents' erroneous understanding of intestacy provisions appears in Johnson &
Robbennolt, Using Social Science, supra note 316, at 489-90 and Jennifer K. Robbennolt
& Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed Partners:
Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 417,442-
44 (1999) [hereinafter Robbennolt & Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed
Partners].
319. The survey revealed that many respondents without wills who claimed to "know"
who would inherit their estate under intestacy were in fact wrong. Johnson &
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
At a minimum, the decedent intent approach could respond in
the intestacy context by recognizing the potential gaps between
presumed intent and actual intent. It could promote educational
measures to inform the public of intestacy schemes and ways to opt
out of such schemes.320 Another possibility might be to extend to
intestacy a remedy for mistake similar to that proposed in the wills
context by Professors Langbein and Waggoner. For example, the
decedent intent approach might allow the survivor of a nonmarital
relationship to inherit if the survivor could prove that the intestate
decedent erroneously believed her partner was her legal heir. Or the
decedent intent approach could go still further and admit extrinsic
evidence of the decedent's actual dispositive preferences.321
The architects of the decedent intent approach will need to
address a number of potential problems and objections, however. For
example, this approach could have significant implications for current
family protection and elective share provisions, which, as Professor
Mann has remarked, "wea[r] their frustration of the testator's intent
proudly. '322 Fortunately, there is a vast reform literature upon which
Robbennolt, Using Social Science, supra note 316, at 489. Most notably, many mistakenly
assumed that their nonmarital partners would inherit as intestate heirs (33.3% of
respondents with opposite-sex partners; 46.8% of female respondents with same-sex
partners; 43.2% of male respondents with same-sex partners). I An earlier empirical
study of married persons found that only 44.6% of those who claimed to know who would
inherit their estate under intestacy "were correct or nearly so." Id. (referring to Fellows et
al., Public Attitudes, supra note 20).
320. In a recent article, Jennifer Robbennolt and Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson have
suggested that lawyers might perform this function both "in general community education
activities" and in individual counseling of clients. See Robbennolt & Johnson, Legal
Planning for Unmarried Committed Partners, supra note 318, at 456-57 (focusing
specifically on education and planning issues for nonmarital committed partnerships).
321. Such an approach would attempt to address the "imbalance" between treatment
of actual intent in testacy and intestacy. Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46,
at 1050. As Professor Mann has stated, "The new availability of the dispensing power to
remove formalistic obstacles to the testator's intent underscores the absence of any similar
dispensation in intestacy, where the default rules remain as invariable as the formal
requirements themselves were." Id. Intestacy rules apply "even if evidence of the
decedent's preference for a different... [scheme] exists that is as persuasive as evidence
of the testator's intent now permitted under § 2-503," which is the dispensing power
provision of the Uniform Probate Code. Id It should be noted, however, that Professor
Mann concludes that there are "compelling administrative reasons why this should be so,"
including the difficulty of proving intent when there exists "no written document to
narrow the inquiry" and the "bureaucratic nightmare" of "an individual inquiry into the
dispositional wishes of everyone who dies." Id.
322. Id. at 1058 (referring to elective share statutes). Indeed, Professor Hernfndez
explicitly cited this factor as a rationale for exploring a decedent-controlled definition of
family in the "manageable context" of challenges over burial instructions. See Hernndez,
supra note 10, at 1018 (stating that "[t]he context of challenges over burial instructions
should be a manageable context in which to respect a testator's own definition of family
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to draw.323 For example, architects might want to explore proposals
for continuing lifetime support duties after death as part of a scheme
that otherwise enforced decedent intent.324
Another likely objection will be that the decedent intent
approach promotes dead hand control.32 By exalting actual intent,
this approach effectively limits courts and legislatures from
addressing what Professor Sherman has called "posthumous
meddling" 326 -decedents' efforts to restrain their survivors' behavior,
religious practices, even choice of marital partner.327  This result,
however, may not in fact be inconsistent with current trends in
inheritance law. For example, state legislatures increasingly are
because it can be divorced from probate court concerns over a testator recognizing his or
her financial support obligations to minor children and spouses").
323. See supra Part II.A, B (discussing this literature).
324. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (citing proposals by Professors Brashier
and Krause). Another objection to the decedent intent approach is that it gives
insufficient recognition to meritorious claimants. Unlike the family paradigm, this
approach does extend protection to nonfamily survivors who provided acts of care to the
decedent. However, it recognizes only those claimants whom the decedent intended to
inherit. Thus, the decedent intent approach allows a decedent to disinherit even the most
worthy individual. This is in fact the approach China has adopted. In an otherwise
behavior-based scheme of inheritance, China allows disinheritance of caring (but not
dependent) survivors. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 107, at
1249-50.
325. For an extended discussion of the concept of "dead hand control," see, for
example, LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955); Gregory S.
Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1985); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 20.
326. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273,
1273 [hereinafter Sherman, Posthumous Meddling].
327. See, e.g., Taylor v. Rapp, 124 S.E.2d 271, 271 (Ga. 1960) (upholding a will
provision disinheriting a daughter if she married "'Jody Taylor, a boy I do not like and
care for in any respects' "); In re Estate of Romero, 847 P.2d 319, 320 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993) (concerning a will provision leaving use of testator's residence to his fiancde "'so
long as she remains unmarried and does not cohabit with an unrelated adult male' " and to
his minor sons "'provided their mother does not reside there also' "); In re Estate of
Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967) (involving will provisions conditioning bequests to
testator's single children on their marrying spouses of" 'true Greek blood and descent and
of Orthodox religion'" and conditioning bequest to testator's married daughter (whose
husband was not Greek) "on her remarrying a man of true Greek blood and descent and
of Orthodox religion after her first marriage was terminated by death or divorce").
Professor Fellows' defense of "imputed intent" suggests another potential objection to
limits on judicial and legislative action. She argues that under the existing imputed intent
approach, courts and legislatures are able to correct individuals' defective estate plans and
ensure distribution of the estate to the decedents' most likely preferred recipients, close
family members. See Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, supra note 54, at 613, 622-30.
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restricting and even repealing the classic defense against dead hand
control, the Rule Against Perpetuities.31
For many, the decedent intent approach will also raise the
specter of judicial discretion and with it greater costs,
unpredictability, and administrative inconvenience. 329 As Professor
Hermindez has argued, this objection is less persuasive in the wills
context where today "an individualized judicial assessment is
automatically triggered. '330  Indeed, the decedent intent approach
actually limits judicial interference with properly executed wills by
defining "natural objects" first and foremost as those individuals the
decedent named in her will. As Professors Langbein and Waggoner
have contended, carefully-crafted remedies for mistake too may
ultimately have "advantages over the patchwork of inconsistency and
injustice that characterize[s] the present law. '331 In particular, the
decedent intent approach may reduce the need for judicial
"dissembling" 332  and bending of the law to ensure "natural
dispositions" to family members or to address individual inequities.
Removing the preference for family from intestacy will present a
greater challenge for architects of the decedent intent approach.
Professor Hermnndez has concluded, for example, that for intestate
succession purposes "[t]he uncertainty inherent in an open inquiry
into decedent preference may not merit the administrative
inconvenience of an individualized assessment and therefore may
328. At least twelve states have already abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities in
some form. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1139-40 (6th ed. 2000) (summarizing legislation in Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin). For an extended discussion of this movement to repeal
the Rule Against Perpetuities, see Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601
(2000); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years
in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1023 (1987). As Professor Dukeminier has emphasized, one
effect of abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities is that tax-exempt dynasty trusts "can
last forever." DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 850; see Jesse Dukeminier,
Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants From Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 422-23
(1996) (discussing the impact of the repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities on creation of
dynasty trusts).
329. For the most influential statement of this view, see Glendon, supra note 135, at
1186-91 (arguing that "under American conditions" fixed rules of inheritance rather than
discretionary schemes are essential to limit litigation, depletion of estates, uncertainty, and
judicial intrusions on testamentary intent). For a summary of the literature and arguments
against adopting foreign models that permit greater judicial discretion in distribution of
estates, see Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 107, at 1204-05, 1214-16.
330. Hern~ndez, supra note 10, at 1018.
331. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 293, at 590.
332. Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46, at 1041.
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justify the use of statutory default distribution schemes instead."333
Even in intestacy, however, architects of the decedent intent
approach could explore schemes that would admit extrinsic evidence
of decedent intent under certain circumstances and impose a high
burden of proof.33 For instance, one such circumstance might be
where the decedent clearly records her preferences in a signed writing
but does not intend the document to be her willy
5
These reforms of intestacy raise another key issue and potential
objection to the decedent intent approach. What scheme determines
distribution of the estate where there is insufficient evidence of the
decedent's actual intent? If the decedent intent approach uses
current intestacy law336 as its default rules, it also retains the family
paradigm.337 As Professor Gallanis has warned, "Default rules may
not be as visible as their mandatory counterparts, but their effects are
no less pernicious. '338  At a minimum, the architects of a decedent
intent approach will need to modernize existing intestacy rules to
reflect the likely donative intent of those most often excluded by
current status-based definitions of family. Professor Gallanis, for
example, has focused on one such group-sexual minorities-and has
recommended a two-part reform strategy consisting of "thorough
empirical research to determine the wishes of most members of the
333. Hernindez, supra note 10, at 1017.
334. Professor Gaubatz has proposed such a scheme: "If no formal will existed, but
informally expressed testamentary expressions were known, ... they could be alleged and,
if proved as to terms and testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence,
established as the will of the decedent." Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 562.
335. Even under the liberal "harmless-error rule," this document would not constitute
a valid will due to lack of testamentary intent. See supra note 309 (setting out harmless-
error provisions of Uniform Probate Code); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1999). A signed writing,
however, would address one of Professor Mann's objections to reform of intestacy by
providing a "written document to narrow the inquiry." Mann, Formalities and Formalism,
supra note 46, at 1050.
336. The decedent intent approach could follow Professor Ascher's lead and "curtail"
inheritance, see Ascher, supra note 125, at 96, in this situation, perhaps even to the point
of making escheat to the state the default rules. This result would likely deviate from the
actual intent of the decedent even more than the family paradigm. There are rare cases,
however, of "public-spirited" testators who will all or part of their estates to the
government. For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes left the residue of his estate to the
"United States of America." See LUCY A. MARSH, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 127-28
(1998) (citing and discussing implementation of Holmes' residuary provision).
337. See Mann, Formalities and Formalism, supra note 46, at 1048 ("The statutory rules
of intestate succession are default rules that approximate what most testators do in their
wills anyway-provide for their immediate families."). Professor Langbein refers to this
as the "backstopping" role of intestacy rules. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance with
the Wills Act, supra note 289, at 499-501.
338. Gallanis, supra note 11, at 1531.
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GLB [gay, lesbian, and bisexual] community" followed by
"translat[ion of] those wishes into workable legislation. '339 Professor
Fellows and her colleagues' survey of committed same-sex and
opposite-sex partners340 provides an important recent illustration of
how empirical study of donative preferences might inform future
efforts to make intestacy statutes more intent-effectuating."
Even updated intestacy laws, however, would remain
problematic as default rules for the decedent intent approach. These
laws too would define the individual decedent by her intestate
category-be it a traditional status-based family category or some
new category. Just as under the current system, updated intestacy
laws would distribute the decedent's estate based on the preferences
of the "average" member of her category rather than the decedent's
own actual or likely intent. Thus, reformers may ultimately conclude
that more radical changes are required to ensure fuller recognition of
decedent intent. One such change might be to allow individuals to
specify on their driver's licenses their preferred default takers.3'
Another possibility might be to adopt a comprehensive decedent
intent scheme that compels the court to determine the particular
decedent's most likely intent-even if that determination had to be
based on the scantiest of evidence.
5. Actual Relationship Approach
It is also possible, although somewhat more difficult, to imagine
an inheritance scheme based upon the actual relationships of the
decedent with others in the decedent's life 43  One of those
339. Id. at 1524.
340. Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 1.
341. See Gallanis, supra note 11, at 1524 ("It is therefore inaccurate and discriminatory
to proclaim the current legal regime as intent-effectuating when the likely intent of
persons within the GLB community has been ignored.").
342. This would extend current approaches that allow individuals to designate on their
licenses whether or not they wish to be organ donors. I am grateful to Bernard Harcourt
for this suggestion.
343. In fact, some reformers have already begun to move in this direction. Professor
Gaubatz has called for a more flexible approach to inheritance that would "better respond
to the variety of different factual situations" and would explicitly consider "such factors as
need of the particular claimant, affective relationship to the decedent, support previously
furnished by the decedent, support furnished decedent by the claimant, and similar
factors." Gaubatz, supra note 44, at 563. The actual scheme Professor Gaubatz
"outline[s]" remains restrictive, however; it defines only "relatives and dependents" of the
decedent as "interested parties." See id. at 562-63. Other reformers have begun to
explore an actual relationship approach in one context, intestacy law. As discussed above,
see supra Part II.B., several scholars have proposed expanding intestacy laws to encompass
survivors of "family-like relationships" with the decedent-that is, "caring, nurturing and
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relationships would be support, whether the decedent was the
recipient or the provider.34 Another would be a financial sharing
arrangement in which the decedent and others contributed to a
common fund that was applied on a basis other than the amounts of
the contributions.s Such financial sharing often occurs in marriage
where the parties maintain only a single, common bank account and
do not concern themselves with the issue of who owns what interest in
property. But such financial sharing also occurs among unmarried
persons who cohabit, among members of communes, and among
members of tribes. 6
loving relationships that do not [meet] ... formal requirements that the family members
be related by blood, legal marriage or adoption to be considered family." Gary, Adapting
Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 80. These reformers have identified a variety of economic,
legal, and social factors that indicate a "marriage-like" committed relationship or a parent-
child relationship between a particular decedent and survivor. See, e.g., Fellows et al.,
Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 62-63 (setting out factors indicating a committed
relationship); Gary, Adapting Intestacy Law, supra note 2, at 81 (listing factors indicating
parent-child relationship); Waggoner Working Draft, reprinted in Fellows et al.,
Committed Partners, supra note 6, at 92-93 (listing factors "to be considered" in
determining whether a "marriage-like" committed relationship existed between two
individuals). See generally Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law, supra note
5, at 1086-91 (discussing multi-factor approaches to defining committed partnerships).
Architects of the actual relationship approach could draw on this literature. The key
difference, however, would be that, unlike existing proposals, the actual relationship
approach would transcend the family paradigm by removing family as its point of
reference. It would not require that the survivor's relationship with the decedent was
"family-like."
344. Several scholars have identified a "support relationship" as a key factor to be
considered in inheritance. See, e.g., Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws, supra note 2, at 81
(describing a model statute defining a positive indication of parent-child relationship
where "[t]he parent provided economic and emotional support for the child; the child
provided economic and emotional support for the parent"); Gaubatz, supra note 44, at
562-63 (recognizing both types of support relationships-where decedent supported
claimant and where claimant supported decedent).
345. Examples of some of the indicators of such financial interdependence include:
[T]he degree to which the parties intermingled their finances, such as by
maintaining joint checking, credit card, or other types of accounts, sharing loan
obligations, sharing a mortgage or lease on the household in which they lived or
on other property or titling the household in which they lived or other property
in joint tenancy.
Waggoner Working Draft § (d)(2), reprinted in Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra
note 6, at 93.
346. See generally RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN
PROPERTY 251-83 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing property ownership in communes, with
specific focus on cases involving the Harmony Society); WAGGONER ET AL, supra note 5,
at 11, 85-103 (referring to "anti-individualistic views found in many tribes and... the
tribes' notion of commonly held property" and discussing financial interdependence
among unmarried cohabitants and possible contractual claims); Patricia A. Cain, A Review
Essay: Tax and Financial Planning for Same-Sex Couples: Recommended Reading, 8 LAW
& SEXUALITY 613, 619-21 (1998) (discussing issues related to sharing of assets by same-
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A third possible relationship between decedent and survivor
would exist where one or both parties "assum[ed] ... legal
responsibility and/or decision-making authority" 347 for the other
party. Such relationship might arise, for example, where one or both
parties designated the other as primary beneficiary of a life insurance
policy or employee benefit plan or as health care decisionmaker.3
A fourth relevant type of relationship would be one in which the
decedent had indicated an attitude of generosity toward a person or
organization that would likely have continued had death not
intervened. For example, the decedent may have made gifts to
particular family members, to a lover, to a college student of the
decedent's own ethnicity or background, or to the decedent's church
or university.
An inheritance scheme based on actual relationship might be
largely congruent with one based on decedent's intent. The types of
relationships described here19 certainly would be evidence of a
possible intent that the persons or organizations involved inherit. But
there remains a subtle and perhaps important difference. The actual
relationship approach would view the relationship from the
perspective of the survivor rather than the decedent. The difference
would be most apparent in the case where the decedent had been
generous in life but harbored a secret intent to disinherit the
survivor.350  In such a system, a testator could maintain full
sex couples); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-
Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 80-91 (1993) (reviewing
empirical studies of financial sharing arrangements among unmarried as well as married
individuals). For an extended discussion of Navajo property concepts, see GETCHES ET
AL., supra note 233, at 413-17. "[P]rivate ownership of lands, such as the fee simple in the
Anglo legal system, is unknown in the Navajo Nation.... A much different concept of
property is recognized by Navajo customs and traditions." IL at 415. "'When we speak
of the Navajo Nation as a whole, its lands and assets belong to those who use it and who
depend upon it for survival-the Navajo People.'" Id (citing Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4
Navajo Rptr. 159, 161 (Window Rock D. Ct. 1983)).
347. Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law, supra note 5, at 1090.
348. I borrow these examples from Professor Waggoner's Working Draft. See
Waggoner Working Draft § (d)(3), reprinted in Fellows et al., Committed Partners, supra
note 6, at 93 (considering "the degree to which the parties formalized legal obligations,
intentions and responsibilities to one another, such as by one or both naming the other as
primary beneficiary of life insurance or employee benefit plans or as agent to make health
care decisions").
349. The four types of relationships described above are by no means intended as an
exhaustive list of relationships that would create inheritance rights under an actual
relationship approach. They are merely illustrations of possible such relationships.
350. Another such case would be where the decedent disinherited an individual who
provided her extensive support and care during her lifetime. The actual relationship
approach would recognize the survivor's acts of care; the decedent intent approach would
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testamentary control only through honesty in her relationships.
Surprise disinheritance over the survivor's objection would be
impossible.
This description of a possible actual relationship approach is
admittedly sketchy. But hopefully this outline is sufficient to
demonstrate that the decedent intent approach is not the only
possible alternative to the family paradigm in the law of inheritance-
and perhaps even sufficient to inspire the search for others.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has aptly observed that, in the
context discussed here, "inheritance law, which at first seems to be a
fortress of the legitimate family, appears on closer inspection to be
more like a museum. '35 ' Inheritance law presents and celebrates a
family ideal that fewer and fewer Americans experience as reality. Its
rules and doctrines are less tools to address contemporary needs than
historical artifacts fashioned for an era now past.
The family paradigm of inheritance law is more than just a relic
of the past. As this Article has shown, it is a source of considerable
hardship for the present. As Americans are increasingly finding
support and affection outside the traditional family, inheritance law
remains entrenched in a paradigm that condemns those relationships
as "unnatural."
The costs of the family paradigm are prohibitive. They fall
particularly heavily on the needy and the caring.352 The privilege
conferred on traditional family relationships comes partly at the
expense of support. Nor are the needy and the caring the only victims
of inheritance law's family paradigm. The paradigm is so inflexible,
outdated, and culturally biased that it harms all touched directly or
indirectly by the inheritance system.35 3  It creates financial,
administrative, and psychological costs for all categories of
participants in the process-heirs, beneficiaries, potential
beneficiaries, decedents, judges, jurors, and lawyers.354 In addition, by
imposing a single vision of "natural" wealth distribution, the family
not.
351. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 290 (referring to the situation where "informal family
relationships are disrupted by death").
352. See supra Part I.
353. See supra Part III.A.
354. See supra Part III.A.1, 2,4.
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paradigm sends a broader message to society that devalues ethnic,
cultural, and individual differences 5
The human costs of American inheritance law have already
sparked significant reform efforts. Legal scholars and lawmakers
have recognized many of the shortcomings of a family-based
inheritance system and responded with an array of innovative legal
and equitable exceptions. These exceptions protect decedents' family
survivors,356 redefine the family to reflect changes in modern
American society,357 and alter procedures to give effect to wills that
deviate from traditional family norms.35 8 Today, the family paradigm
is so riddled with exceptions that it has outlived its usefulness.
Indeed, if experience in the hard sciences is any guide, inheritance
law appears poised for an imminent paradigm shift.359 Yet, reformers
continue to confine their search for answers to a paradigm that can
provide only stock responses from the past.
This Article has offered some preliminary ideas about possible
future alternatives to the family paradigm. The most radical response
would be to abolish inheritance altogether.36 Another possibility
would be to draw on foreign precedent and base inheritance rights on
a support relationship prior to death, either one in which the
decedent supported the claimant or vice versa. 61 Or inheritance law
might make the individual decedent's intent the determinant of
inheritance rights.362  For those who prefer to focus on the
understandings of survivors rather than the intent of decedents,
inheritance based on actual relationship between decedent and
claimant might offer a more promising approach.3 63  There are
undoubtedly other directions that inheritance law might take as well.
The ultimate choice of direction will require extended study and
debate of such factors as the respective costs and benefits of each
approach, the social and cultural values at stake, and any political
constraints. But the search for new answers can begin only when
355. See supra Part III.A.3, 5.
356. See supra Part II.A.
357. See supra Part II.B.
358. See supra Parts II.C, III.A.4.
359. See KUHN, supra note 16, at 66-76 (discussing and providing examples of
paradigm shifts).
360. See supra Part III.B.1.
361. See supra Part III.B.3.
362. See supra Part III.B.4.
363. See supra Part III.B.5.
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reformers take the first step and see the family paradigm for what it
is-the problem, not the solution, for American inheritance law 64
Rejection of the family paradigm will not destroy the family. For
many of us, the family will remain, as Professor Glendon described it,
"the only theater in which we can realize our full capacity for good or
evil, joy or suffering." 65 But at the same time, we should hope that
future American inheritance law will also recognize that the "ties of
human affection"3" do not run solely along family lines.
364. For examples of similar approaches to problems in other legal fields, see Frances
H. Foster, The Illusory Promise: Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong, China, 73 IND. LJ.
765, 796 (1998) (arguing that "the search for [new U.S. policies toward Chinese Hong
Kong] ... can only begin once American policymakers have removed the blinders that
prevent them from seeing the truth-that China's 'promise' of 'freedom of the press' for
Hong Kong is merely the product of bad translation and wishful thinking"); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 696, 762 (1999) (arguing in the international bankruptcy context that
"[t]he time has come to recognize that universalism is the problem, not the solution, and
to put universalism behind us").
365. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 313.
366. Id
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